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Confusing the Fifth Amendment with the Sixth: Lower Court
Misapplication of the Innis Definition of Interrogation
INTRODUCTION

For centuries, Anglo-American law enforcement has relied on confessions to prosecute individuals accused of crimes. 1 At common law,
any confession, even one obtained by physical torture, could be entered into evidence against a defendant. 2 But beginning in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, courts started ·to establish rules that
limited the excesses of police practices. 3 Since that time there· has been
tremendous debate as to what constitutes improper "police interrogation." In this century, scholars and jurists continue to disagree over
the role and significance of confessions in criminal investigation and
prosecution.4 Some have contended that interrogation is a necessary
component of modem law enforcement, 5 while others have suggested
that it is not indispensable. 6 Still others have concluded that dependence on confessions is d~gerous to a free society. 7 ·
Despite these disagreements, most will concede that modem interrogation no longer relies on the use of physical force to the extent that
was once common. Rather, police employ more subtle forms of interrogation comprised of psychological ploys and techniques. 8 Such
practices, however, are equally susceptible to abuse, 9 and commenta1. See generally W. L.AFAVE & J. ,lsRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE§ 6.2(a) (1985).
2. Id.
3. Id.; Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 518 (6th
ed. 1986) [hereinafter MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE]; see also The King v. Warickshall, 168
Eng. Rep. 234, L. Leach Cr. Cases 263 (K.B. 1783) (first stated formal rule of exclusion for
improper confessions)..
4. See generally W. LAFAVE & J. ~SRAEL, supra note 1, at§ 6.l(a).
5. See, e.g., lnbau, Police f nterrogation - A Practical Necessity, 52 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 16 (1961) (suggesting the importance of interrogating suspects in order to
solve crimes); Grano, Rhode Island v. Innis: A Need to Reconsider the Constitutional Premises
Underlying the Law of Confessions, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1 (1979) (suggesting that police interrogation is not only desirable, but essential to successful law enforcement).
6. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966).
7. See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1964) ("We have learned the lesson of
history, ancient and modem, that a system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend
on the 'confession' will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system
which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful investigation.")
(footnotes omitted).
8. Inbau, supra note 5, at 16; see also W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, at § 6.l(b)
("['f]here does seem to be general agreement that forms of illegality have become less extreme.");
0. STEPHENS, THE SUPREME CoURT AND CoNFESSIONS OF GUILT 5-6 (1973) ("The use of
overt physical violence has largely given way to the employment of more subtle kinds of
pressure.").
9. W. LAFAVE & J. lsRAEL, supra note 1, at§ 6.l(b).
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tors continue to debate the propriety of these methods. 10
The Supreme Court struggled with the problems posed by interrogation begining in the mid-1930s 11 and culminating with Miranda v.
Arizona, 12 which set down rules designed to limit the excesses of police
practices. The Miranda Court quoted at length from police interrogation manuals, but it never said flatly that any of the practices were
banned by the Constitution or that their use alone would render a
confession inadmissible. Rather, the Court held that absent the now
familiar warnings, confessions obtained by means of "custodial interrogation" would be inadmissible. 13
It was not until 1980, in Rhode Island v. Innis, 14 that the Court
provided much guidance as to what it meant by "interrogation." In
Innis, the Court made it plain that conduct other than direct questioning could constitute interrogation. Writing for a divided Court, Justice Stewart defined interrogation as "words or actions on the part of
police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that
the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from the suspect."ts
Numerous subsequent cases have applied the Innis standard.
Although lower courts have utilized this standard on a case-by-case
basis, this Note groups cases according to six fact patterns. Such classification reveals common methods of reasoning and demonstrates
what the Innis standard has come to mean in practice.
The first group of cases involves situations in which the presence of
friends or relatives helps produce incriminating statements. 16 A second group of cases considers volunteered statements and follow-up
questions.17 Such statements typically occur after a suspect makes a
harmless, voluntary statement, and the police respond with a followup question that produces an incriminating response. A third category of cases focuses on the exception Innis carved out for procedures
10. Compare lnbau, supra note 5, at 16 (contending that most crimes can be solved only
through the use of admissions and confessions, and that suspects will not admit their guilt unless
questioned) and Grano, Book Review, 84 MICH. L. REV. 662, 690 (1986) (reviewing F. INBAU, J.
REID & J. BUCKLEY, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CoNFESSIONS (3d ed. 1986)) (arguing
that reasonable interrogation designed to convince a suspect to tell the truth is completely consis·
tent with a free, civilized, and just society) with Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Per·
sons: A Skeptical View, 52 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 21, 46 (1961) (contending
that any pre-judicial interrogation is irreconcilable with the privilege against self-incrimination
and the right to counsel) and White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
581 (1979) (arguing that effective protection of constitutional rights can be achieved only
through the development of per se rules prohibiting certain forms of police trickery).
11. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, at§ 6.l(c).
12. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
13. 384 U.S. at 444-45.
14. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
15. 446 U.S. at 301 (footnote omitted).
16. See infra Part II.A.
17. See infra Part 11.B.
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that are "normally attendant to arrest and custody." 18 These cases
consider the permissibility of procedures and questions that are part of
police processing. Still another group involves "subtle compulsion" those acts directed toward a suspect or words spoken among others in
the presence of the suspect that produce an incriminating response.19
A fifth class of decisions has also applied the Innis test to the common
police practice of using a ''jail plant" to acquire incriminating information from an incarcerated defendant. 20 The sixth and final group of
cases concerns "implied questioning" - police statements that are not
questions but where arguably "[e]verything [is] there but a question
mark." 21 These cases can involve casual conversations between police
officers and a suspect that, though unrelated to the crime, eventually
produce incriminating statements. They also embrace situations in
which spontaneous remarks of shock or surprise by police officers induce damaging responses.
Lower courts disagree over how to apply the Innis standard for
interrogation in these various common fact patterns. This Note examines how these courts have applied or misapplied Innis, and concludes
that, while many of these decisions are consistent with Miranda and
Innis, too many others are not.
In order to evaluate these cases, it is first necessary to understand
the meaning and significance of Innis. Part I thus considers Innis and
its background. Part II then examines lower court decisions applying
the Innis test, dividing these decisions into six groups based on the
most common factual scenarios. Because the cases deal with factually
specific police practices, this method constitutes the most useful way
to analyze the impact of the Innis definition of interrogation. Part III
proposes a reading of the Innis test that avoids the diffi.cultie_s encountered by lower courts and that is consistent with the dictates of Miranda and Innis. The Note concludes by considering how lower
courts applying Innis have confused fifth and sixth amendment methods of analysis.
I.

BACKGROUND: RHODE ISLAND V. INNIS AND INTERROGATION

In Miranda and Innis the Supreme Court demonstrated a concern
about police practices that compel a suspect to make incriminating
statements. These decisions mandate that lower courts analyzing interrogation assess a suspect's perception of the coerciveness of police
behavior. For the Court, the suspect's perceptions, and not the intent
18. 446 U.S. at 301; see infra Part 11.C.
19. See infra Part 11.D.
20. See infra Part 11.E.
21. Combs v. Commonwealth, 438 S.W.2d 82, 86 (Ky. 1969) (Palmore, J., dissenting); see
infra Part 11.F.
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of the officers, are dispositive. 22
A.

Massiah v. United States and the Right to Counsel

In Massiah v. United States, 23 the Supreme Court considered the
significance of what is sometimes, but misleadingly, called interrogation in the context of the sixth amendment right to counsel. 24 It is
necessary to consider the Court's approach to police practices in the
context of the sixth amendment to understand how the focus of Innis
is different. Innis, a fifth amendment case, is concerned with compulsion and the perceptions of the suspect. Sixth amendment analysis,
under Massiah, turns on police intent.
Massiah concerned a defendant who was released on bail after having been indicted. His co-defendant, in cooperation with the government, invited Massiah to discuss the case in a car equipped with a
radio transmitter. Federal agents overheard the transmitted conversation and used Massiah's statements against him at ttjal. The Supreme
Court found these statements inadmissible as defendant had been subjected to extrajudicial, police-orchestrated proceedings designed to
elicit an incriminating response. 25 The Massiah decision established
that once a defendant is indicted, "the suspect" becomes "the accused" and the right to counsel attaches. Massiah's incriminating
words were inadmissible as they "had been deliberately elicited from
him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his retained
counsel. " 26
22. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 ("The latter portion of [the Innis] definition [of interrogation]
focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police.").
23. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
24. Wh~t is sometimes labelled "interrogation" in the context of sixth amendment or Massiah doctrine is not really "interrogation" at all, as that term is used in the Miranda context.
Confusion results from the fact that in ~rewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), the Court, per
Justice Stewart, said: "[T]he clear rule of Massiah is that once adversary proceedings have [be·
gun, a person] has a right to legal representation when the government interrogates him." 430
U.S. at 401 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Professor Yale Kamisar criticized Justice Stewart for using the term "interrogation," point·
ing out that there was nothing resembling Miranda-type "interrogation" in the Massiah case
itself. -Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah and Miranda: What is "Interrogation"? When
Does it Matter?, 67 GEO. L.J. 1,.33 (1978) (suggesting that compulsion is required before something constitutes interrogation) [hereinafter Kamisar, What is Interrogation?]; see also W.
LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, at§ 6.4(d). Rather, all that is needed for Massiah to apply,
as Stewart recognized at other places in Williams, is for the government to deliberately elicit
statements from a person after he has been indicted. 430 U.S. at 387. In Rhode Island v. Innis,
446 U.S. 291 (1980), an opinion also written by Stewart, the Court apparently recognized that
the term "interrogation" may not be appropriate in the sixth amendment context. 446 U.S. at
300 n.4. Stewart's Innis opinion stated that the term "interrogation" is not "necessarily interchangeable" in the Miranda and Massiah contexts since the policies underlying these doctrines
are "quite distinct." Seemingly acknowledging his earlier error, Stewart explicitly referred to the
Kamisar article that criticized his misuse of the term "interrogation" in Williams, 446 U.S. at
300 n.4.
·
25. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 204.
26. 377 U.S. at 204.
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The Massiah doctrine protects the right of individuals to receive
the aid of counsel through each step of the adversary process. Massiah
provides protection by preventing the government from deliberately
eliciting or inducing incriminating statements - an analysis which
turns on the government's purpose.27 If the government's actions are
intended to produce an incriminating response, Massiah holds that the
sixth amendment rights of the suspect have been violated. 28
Under Massiah, the perceptions of the suspect are not significant.
Indeed, it makes no difference whether or not the individual is aware
that she is dealing with a government agent. 29 The police violate that
right by intentionally or deliberately eliciting statements from a person
without counsel after adversary proceedings have commenced.
For a time, the Court considered extending Massiah protections to
the pre-indictment period. 30 This prospect worried many critics of the
Court who were somewhat relieved when the Miranda Court turned
27. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). Williams is credited with having revitalized the Massiah approach after Miranda had cast doubt on its continued significance. See W.
LAFAVE & J. lsRAEL, supra note 1, at § 6.4(d). Williams, in Massiah type reasoning, focused on
the fact that the "detective deliberately and designedly set out to elicit information" from the
defendant. 430 U.S. at 399. The Court, in United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980), a more
recent case in the Massiah line, "refined" Massiah in the same way that Innis clarified Miranda.
See White, Interrogation Without Question: Rhode Island v. Innis and United States v. Henry,
78 MICH. L. REv. 1209 (1980). Professor White suggests that Henry extended Massiah by "applying it to a situation where there was no showing that a government agent did anything
designed to elicit incriminating remarks." Id. at 1220. But see Kamisar, Police Interrogation and
Confessions, in J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRIBE, 2 THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND
DEVELOPMENTS 1979-1980, at 83, 104 (1981) [hereinafter TRENDS] (remarks of Professor
Kamisar) (although the Henry majority's analysis lacked precision, Henry appears to be viewed
by the majority as a genuine 'deliberately elicited' type of case). In other words, after Henry it is
still true that Massiah turns solely on the underlying intent of the government's agents. Id.
28. 377 U.S. at 205-06.
29. 377 U.S. at 206 ("Massiah was more seriously imposed upon ... because he did not even
know that he was under interrogation by a government agent.") (quoting U.S. v. Massiah, 307
F.2d 62, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1962)(Hays, J., dissenting).
30. In Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), the Court seemingly applied Massiah to the
admissibility of incriminating statements made by an individual before the commencement of
adversary proceedings. Escobedo had been arrested on suspicion of murder after being accused
by his accomplice. While in custody, Escobedo repeatedly asked to speak to his lawyer but was
denied the opportunity. Instead, the police set up a confrontation between Escobedo and his
accomplice. At this point, Escobedo denied his guilt and charged his accuser with firing the
murder shots, thus implicating himself in the murder plot. At trial, these statements were admitted into evidence and Escobedo was convicted of murder. The Supreme Court reversed the
conviction and criticized police on the use of confessions. 378 U.S. at 484, 488-90. By suggesting
that there was "no meaningful distinction ... between interrogation of an accused before and
after formal indictment," 378 U.S. at 486, the Escobedo Court appeared to move the sixth
amendment right to counsel protections to the pre-indictment period and thus into the police
station. See 378 U.S. at 490-91. Henceforth, it seemed that lower courts would be required to
apply Massiah's "deliberately elicited" standard to all police "interrogation."
Language in Escobedo threatened to eliminate completely the use of confessions. Confessions
would cease because most attorneys would advise their clients to remain silent. This prospect led
critics of the Court's approach to protest that an individual does not have a right not to confess;
rather, the critics argue, the individual only has a right not to be compelled to confess. See Enker
& Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L.
REv. 47, 60-61 (1964); Kamisar, What is Interrogation?, supra note 24, at 48.
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from Massiah's sixth amendment approach to a focus on the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 31 Interrogation prior
to indictment has become the primary concern of the fifth rather than
the sixth amendment, 32 and while Massiah remains good law, it is relevant only to the post-indictment stage. During this stage, Massiah
protects the right to counsel through each step of the adversary process. Impermissible police interference with that right includes all actions that attempt to "deliberately elicit" incriminating responses.
Miranda and Innis, however, were fifth amendment cases and Innis' definition of interrogation in the fifth amendment context rested
upon and was shaped by a different premise. 33 In Innis, intent was of
only limited significance.34
B. Miranda v. Arizona and the Right Against Self-Incrimination
As noted above, the Massiah holding rested on the sixth amendright to counsel. The Miranda decision shifted that focus and
developed an interrogation doctrine based on the fifth amendment. 35
The Miranda Court held that the privilege against self-incrimination

me~t

31. See MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 3, at 535-37.
32. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (stating that Escobedo is now limited in its
"holding ..• to its own facts."). In Kirby, the Supreme Court declined to extend sixth amendment pre-adversary proceeding protections to the line-up context. See also infra note 45 and
accompanying text (sixth amendment rights and the Massiah doctrine apply only after the initiation of formal charges). Escobedo is now viewed as a "false start" toward protections that later
would be the province of Miranda. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note I, at§ 6.4(c).
33. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) ("The definitions of 'interrogation'
under the Fifth and Sixth Amendment ... are not necessarily interchangeable, since the policies
underlying the two constitutional protections are quite distinct."); Kamisar, What is "Interrogation"?, supra note 24 at 41-55.
34. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 303.
35. Escobedo's potential to eliminate even voluntary confessions, see supra note 30 and accompanying text, accounts in part for the shift to the fifth amendment's protection against selfincrimination in subsequent cases. See MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 3, at 535.
The privilege against self-incrimination had not been used before because many believed it was
only relevant to cases of legal compulsion. Because police do not have legal power to force
someone to answer a question, police interrogation was not thought to violate the fifth amendment. Id. at 536; see also L. MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT? 82-83,
223-32 (1959); W. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY, 16-18 (1967).
In fact, it has been argued that police often act as if, and give suspects the impression that,
they have such authority. Generally, suspects answer police questions because they are misled
into believing that they must. Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments
on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. REV. 59, (1966).
Consequently, the station house, or the "gatehouse of American Criminal Procedure," represents
an inherently compulsive environment. Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions
ofAmerican Criminal Procedure, in Y. KAMISAR, F. INBAU & T. ARNOLD, CRIMINAL JumcE
IN OUR TIME 19-36 (Howard ed. 1965); see also Weisberg, supra note 10, at 21.
In his study, Magistrate Weisberg examined police interrogation practices through a study of
police interrogation manuals, and concluded that effective police interrogation was essentially
unfair and inherently coercive. But see Grano, supra note 5, at 26 (suggesting that "application
of even the fifth amendment protection against compulsory self-incrimination beyond the judicial
context ... is dubious.").
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"is fully applicable during a period of custodial interrogation." 36 After considering common police practices, the Court noted that "we
concern ourselves primarily with this interrogation atmosphere and
the evils it can bring." 37 The Court conceded that "we might not find
the defendant's statements to have been involuntary in traditional
terms." It insisted, however, that "[u]nless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the
product of his free choice."38 Miranda thus held that evidence obtained by interrogation was inadmissible if the means of interrogation
violated the procedural requirements of the Constitution. 39
Several limits on the use of confessions follow from this conclusion. First, Miranda bars evidence obtained by interrogation prior to
the giving of the "Miranda warnings." Second, if an individual indicates that he or she wishes to remain silent, interrogation must cease.
Third, if the individual requests an attorney, no further interrogation
is permitted until an attorney is present.40
36. 384 U.S. 436, 460-61 (1966). The Supreme Court has also rejected the view thatMiranda
applies only to questioning of a suspect who is in custody in connection with the case under
investigation, Mathis v. United States 391 U.S. 1 (1968). Other cases find that it makes no
difference whether the police consider the defendant a suspect or a witness; custodial interrogation can take place even though the police contend that the individual being questioned was a
witness. See, e.g., People v. Lee, 630 P.2d 583 (Colo. 1981) (en bane), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1162
(1982).
37. 384 U.S. at 456.
38. 384 U.S. at 457-58.
39. 384 U.S. at 457-58.
40. 384 U.S. at 467-70. The Miranda doctrine might be thought to afford two levels of protection. "First level" protections exist before a suspect is given the Miranda warnings and before
she invokes the right to counsel. Courts that consider "first level" protections should evaluate
whether police action rose to the level of interrogation. "Second level" protections exist once a
suspect invokes the right to remain silent or asks for a lawyer. See Y. Kamisar, "Police Interrogation and Confessions," Prepared Remarks at the U.S. Law Week's Constitutional Law Conference 32-34 (Sept. 12, 1987) (on file with Professor Kamisar) [hereinafter Kamisar, U.S. Law
Week Remarks]. Once the right to remain silent has been asserted, the issue is whether the
police "scrupulously honored" the suspect's assertion of the right or whether they impermissibly
prompted the suspect to change her mind. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975). When
the suspect asserts her right to counsel, the analysis is different. In such a case, the police may no
longer interrogate the suspect until counsel has been made available or the accused herself initiates further communication. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981) (stating that
once a suspect invokes his right to counsel, a "waiver of that right cannot be established by
showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he had
been advised of his rights;" the suspect cannot be "subject to further interrogation . . . until
counsel has been made available to him, unless the [suspect] himself initiates further communication ... with the police."). See also W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, at§ 6.9(g) (making
clear that there is a different approach for questioning after the right to remain silent is invoked
than after the defendant requests a lawyer).
This distinction between the right to counsel and the right to remain silent was reinforced by
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983), where the Court suggested a two-step analysis to
determine the admissibility of a confession after the right to counsel has been invoked. Step one
asks whether the defendant "initiated" further conversation; step two asks whether "the purported waiver was knowing and intelligent." 462 U.S. at 1046 (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451
U.S. 477, 486 n.9 (1981)). See also Arizona v. Roberson, 108 S. Ct. 2093, 2099 (1988) (distin-
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It is important to note that the Miranda decision requires courts to
examine whether or not the police attempted to compel41 an incriminating :i;esponse42 and that the doctrine protects suspects prior to the
commencement of adversary proceedings.43 Miranda is thus distinct
from Massiah, 44 which applies whether or not the authorities compelled incriminating statements and does not furnish protection before
adversary proceedings have begun.45
Miranda's focus on compulsion arises from the fact that its
rationale rests on the fifth amendment. The fifth amendment provides
that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself." 46 As a result, commentators have suggested that
there is no right not to confess; there is only a right not to be compelled to confess.47 The language of Miranda itself supports this propguishing Mosley because "a suspect's decision to cut off questioning, unlike his request for coun·
set, does not raise the presumption that he is unable to proceed without a lawyer's advice")
(citations omitted). But see TRENDS, supra note 27, at 153-57 (remarks of Professor Kamisar)
(suggesting that the standard should be the same if police questioning resumes after either the
right to counsel or the right to remain silent has been invoked).
However, the Supreme Court appears to have blurred the distinction between first and second
level protections. In Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 529-30 (1987), the Court took the position
that the police "scrupulously honor'' a suspect's assertion of her rights as long as they do not
engage in "interrogation" after those rights have been invoked.
41. See Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 440-46 (1987).
Schulhofer discusses the apparent confusion regarding the meaning of the term "compulsion."
He makes clear that "compulsion" under Miranda is analytically distinct from "coercion" and
"involuntariness" under the due process standard. The voluntariness due process standard has
been extensively criticized and many have considered it unworkable. See, e.g., sources cited infra
note 164. For Schulhofer, voluntariness analysis considers whether police actions "break the
suspect's will." Schulhofer, supra at 446 (footnote omitted). The Miranda Court did not create
so stringent a test when it considered "compulsion" within the meaning of the fifth amendment.
On the contrary, behavior that falls far short of "breaking the suspect's will" may constitute
"compulsion." Compulsion extends to all governmental efforts intended to pressure an unwilling
individual to assist as a witness in his own prosecution. "Custodial interrogation brings psychological pressure to bear for the specific purpose of overcoming the suspect's unwillingness to talk,
and it is therefore inherently compelling within the meaning of the fifth amendment." Id.
42. "Incriminating response" refers to any response the prosecution may seek to introduce at
trial. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966).
43. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (footnote omitted) The Miranda Court
dealt with "custodial interrogation," meaning "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way." See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. For discussion of when Mi·
randa protections come into play, see Kamisar, "Custodial Interrogation" Within the Meaning of
Miranda, in CRIMINAL LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION - SOURCES AND COMMENTARIES 335,
338-51 (1968); Smith, The Threshold Question in Applying Miranda: What Constitutes Custodial
Inte"ogation?, 25 S. C.L. REv. 699, 707-10 (1974); Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger
Court, 1977 SUP. Cr. REV. 99, 149.
44. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
45. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) ("[T]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel does
not attach until after the initiation of formal charges."); see Maine v. Moulton, 464 U.S. 159, 170
(1985) (looking to the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings is fundamental to the proper
application of the sixth amendment right to counsel).
46. U.S. CoNsr. amend. V (emphasis added).
47. See, e.g., H. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 271 (1967); Enker & Elsen, supra note 30, at 60;
Kamisar, What Is Inte"ogation?, supra note 24, at 48.
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osition. The purpose of Miranda's protective devices was to ''dispel
the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings."48 After discussing various police interrogation tactics, the Court expressed concern
with situations in which "[a]n individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and
subjected to the techniques of persuasion described above cannot be
otherwise than under compulsion to speak. " 49 In effect, this approach
constituted a rejection of Massiah's sixth amendment approach to interrogation;50 the Court's Miranda opinion did not even mention Massiah. Under Miranda, instead of considering whether police conduct
"deliberately elicited" incriminating statements, courts had to determine whether police conduct compelled them. 51
More recent decisions have not changed the significance of compulsion to the issue of interrogation. 52 For police action to rise to the
level of interrogation under the fifth amendment, it must involve the
requisite degree of compulsion. 53
48. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458 (emphasis added).
49. 384 U.S. at 461 (emphasis added). The Court also noted that "without proper safeguards
the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel
him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely." 384 U.S. at 467 (emphasis added).
50. Some have suggested that interrogation is irrelevant to Massiah. See supra note 24.
51. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text. Evidence of the shift in focus can be found
in Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303-04 (1966), where the Court considered facts similar
to the Massiah case. In Hoffa, a government informer elicited incriminating information from a
defendant who had been released from jail. But Hoffa, unlike Massiah, had not been indicted
and so the court did not use Massiah's deliberately elicited standard. Rather, it applied Miranda
and found the government's behavior permissible because there had been no compulsion. Since
Hoffa did not know he was dealing with a government agent there was no pressure on him
(inherent, informal or otherwise) to make incriminating statements and his right against selfinprimination had not been violated. It was the suspect's perspective that was significant. See
also Kamisar, What ls Interrogation?, supra note 24, at 63-65 ("[I]f it is not 'custodial police
interrogation' in the eye of the beholder, then it is not such interrogation within the meaning of
Miranda.") (emphasis in the original). But compare White, supra, note 10, at 602-05 (favoring a
per se prohibition against deceiving a suspect about whether an interrogation is taking place,
even during the period before indictment).
52. In Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976), and Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S.
492 (1977), the Burger Court limited Miranda to situations involving "coercive environments"
similar to those considered by the Miranda Court itself. In Mathiason, the Court stated that "[i]t
was that sort of coercive environment to which Miranda by its terms was made applicable, and to
which it is limited." 492 U.S. at 495. Despite this limitation, compulsion, and not police intent,
is still dispositive to fifth amendment analysis.
53. But see Grano, supra note 10, at 683-89. Even Grano, a critic of Miranda, concedes that
under Miranda a suspect cannot be compelled to make self-incriminating statements. Given this
fact, he directs attention to "the task of defining compulsion in the context of police interrogation." Id. at 684. Only the requisite degree of compulsion is a constitutional violation. He
criticizes those who overlook the fact "that distinguishing degrees is inherent in the process of
defining the concept of compulsion," Id. at 688. For Grano, the point at which the degree of
compulsion becomes "undue" should be a matter of policy, reflecting "society's desire, on the
one hand, for successful police interrogation and society's revulsion, on the other hand, of certain
offensive police methods." Id. at 687. 'Grano favors a return to the voluntariness test and due
process approach to interrogation by incorporating these concepts into the meaning of "compulsion." See infra note 164 (discussing voluntariness test). Thus, he would find improper compul-
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The Innis Test for Interrogation and Subsequent Commentary

1.

The Decision Itself

Despite Miranda's direction to consider the level of compulsion,
lower courts remained confused as to what constituted interrogation.
Some courts took a narrow view, finding that only direct questions
constituted interrogation. 54 Other jurists suggested that there were
many police practices that had "everything ... but a question mark"
and that these methods generated the same pressures to confess that
the Miranda warnings were designed to mitigate. 55
In Rhode Island v. Innis, 56 the Court clarified the issue and defined
what it had meant by "interrogation." The case arose when Thomas
Innis was arrested on suspicion of murder, received Miranda warnings, and asked to speak to an attorney. He was placed in the back
seat of a police car for transport to the police station. While en route,
two of the officers in the front seat, knowing that they could be overheard, engaged in a conversation regarding the missing murder
weapon. One officer stated that there were many handicapped children in the area and "God forbid one of them might find a weapon
with shells and they might hurt themselves." 57 Upon hearing the conversation, defendant asked that the car be turned around so he could
lead the police to the weapon. 58 His attorneys later sought to suppress
evidence of both the weapon and his statements in connection with its
discovery.
Noting that many of the police methods criticized in Miranda did
not involve direct questioning, the Innis Court observed that "the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent." 59
Justice Stewart then wrote: " 'interrogation' under Miranda refers not
only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the
part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and
sion only after considering the "totality of the circumstances" and only if the "free will of the
witness was overborne." Grano, supra note 10, at 688 (quoting United States v. Washington, 431
U.S. 181, 188 (1987)). However, Grano concedes that his approach is inconsistent with Miranda, which protected against "the inherent pressure of custodial interrogation." Id. at 689.
See also supra note 41 (discussing the meaning of compulsion under Miranda and how it is
distinct from involuntariness) and note 51 and accompanying text.
A more appropriate reading of Miranda is that it prohibits compulsion that goes beyond the
pressures inherent in custody. As Innis itSelf states, " '[i]nterrogation,' as conceptualized in the
Miranda opinion, must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (footnote omitted).
54. w. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, at§ 6.7(a).
55. See, e.g., Combs v. Commonwealth, 438 S.W.2d 82, 86 (Ky. 1969) (Palmore, J.,
dissenting).
56. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
57. 446 U.S. at 294-95.
58. 446 U.S. at 295-96.
59. 446 U.S. at 300-01.
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custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect. " 60 The Court explicitly
stated that the focus of the test, which reflects the purposes of Miranda, was on the perceptions of the suspect rather than on the intent
of the police. 61 The Innis Court's references to Miranda also reinforce
the significance of perceived compulsion in the context of the fifth
amendment. As Justice Stewart's Innis opinion pointed out, Miranda
was concerned that the " 'interrogation environment' created by the
interplay of interrogation and custody would 'subjugate the individual
to the will of his examiner' and thereby undermine the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination." 62 Yet interrogation still had to
"reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in
custody itself." 63
In a footnote, the Court discussed the limited relevance of police
intent and distinguished Massiah by rejecting the "deliberately elicited" approach of sixth amendment analysis. 64 Nothing in the record
of the case indicated that the officer's remarks "were designed to elicit
a response." 65 For the Court, intent was significant only to the extent
that it reflected whether the police knew, or should have known, that
their words or actions were reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response. 66 Consideration of intent in these terms means only that
police cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their
words or actions. 67 Police action has to be judged in terms of what the
officers knew or should have known. In practice this means that if
something about a suspect makes him peculiarly susceptible to a particular police action, interrogation occurs only if police should have
known of this peculiarity. Intent becomes relevant only to the issue of
foreseeability. 68 The Court thus made clear that important distinc60. 446 U.S. at 301 (footnotes omitted).
61. 446 U.S. at 301 ("The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily on the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police.").
62. 446 U.S. at 299 (quoting Miranda, 440 U.S. at 457-58) (emphasis added).
63. 446 U.S. at 300 (footnote omitted).
64. 446 U.S. at 300 n.4; see generally supra notes 23-34 & 50-51 and accompanying text
(discussing Massiah).
65. 446 U.S. at 303 n.9 (emphasis in original); see TRENDS, supra note 27, at 88.
66. 446 U.S. at 302 n.7. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, at§ 6.7(a) ("[I]t surely
does not make sense to conclude that under Miranda the existence of 'interrogation' ... depends
upon the undisclosed intentions of the officer. Miranda is grounded in the notion that custody
plus interrogation produces a coercive atmosphere, which makes sense only when the suspect is
aware of both custody and the interrogation."); see also MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra
note 3, at 595; infra notes 83-88 and accompanying text (discussing dangers of intent analysis).
67. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-02 ("But, since the police surely cannot be held accountable for the
unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to
words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely
to elicit an incriminating response.") (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
68. The Innis Court's "reasonably likely" language may have been intended to convey foreseeability, the likelihood that an officer would know the practice was wrong, rather than the
probability of success of the practice. Such a reading is endorsed by the majority opinion which
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tions exist between the definitions of interrogation under the fifth and
sixth amendments (if the latter even involved the term "interrogation"). 69
The Court went on to hold Innis' confession admissible because
the "dangerous weapon conversation" did not constitute interrogation. 70 The Court found that although the defendant may have been
subjected to "subtle coercion," his response was not the product of
conduct that the police should have known was reasonably likely· to
elicit an incriminating response. 71
2. Subsequent Commentary
Innis' "reasonably likely to elicit" test is ambiguous on its face and
is made even more confused by a result that the dissenters charged,
with some reason, "verges on the ludicrous." 72 According to the dissenters, the officer's strong appeal to Innis' conscience seemed more
than reasonably likely to elicit some response. 73 Although all but one
Justice agreed with the "reasonably likely to elicit" test in the abstract,
the Court failed to articulate a clear, substantive definition. 74 Commentators and jurists have struggled to determine the, meaning of Innis
by attempting to square the result with the test as it was articulated by
the majority. 75
Three different interpretations of Innis are worthy of note. The
first concerns the attempt by dissenting Justice Stevens to reconcile the
majority's result with the articulated test. Justice Stevens criticized
the majority's test because, as he read it, it turned on the apparent
probability that police speech or conduct would elicit an incriminating
response. 76 Under such a reading, the Court would prohibit only poappears to contrast likelihood and unforeseeability. 446 U.S. at 301-02. See also TRENDS, supra
note 27, at 91-94 (remarks by Professor Kamisar) (suggesting that "reasonably likely" should be
read to convey foreseeability and finding interrogation where police speech or conduct
"foreseeably might elicit an incriminating statement or ... that would normally be understood as
calling for a response about the merits of the case.") (emphasis in original).
69. 446 U.S. at 300 n.4 ("The definitions of 'interrogation' under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, if indeed the term 'interrogation' is even apt in the Sixth Amendment context, are not
necessarily interchangeable, since the policies underlying the two constitutional protections are
quite distinct.") (citation omitted).
70. 446 U.S. at 302-03.
71. 446 U.S. at 303.
72. 446 U.S. at 306 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
73. 446 U.S. at 307.
74. W. LAFAVE & J. lsRAEL, supra note 1, at § 6. 7(a). Interestingly, both the state and the
defendant proposed the test adopted by the Court though they argued that it should be applied
differently. See Brief for Petitioner at 21, 25 & n.12, Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980)
(No. 78-1076); Brief for Respondent at 24-25, Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (No,
78-1076). As a result, the Court may have been less alert to the problems the test would subsequently create.
75. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, at§ 6.7(a); White, supra note 27, at 1224-36.
76. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, at§ 6.7(a); White, supra note 27, at 1224-25.
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lice conduct that was "apparently likely to be successful" in eliciting
incriminating statements.77 What level of probability was "high
enough," however, remained unclear. Consequently, such an interpretation of the test might permit lower courts to consider too many factors and to apply their subjective preferences. 78
Other commentators have taken a different interpretation. Professor Welsh White believes that the Court meant to create an "objective
observer" test. Under this approach, the issue becomes whether an
objective observer, with the same knowledge of the suspect as the police, would infer upon hearing the officer's remarks that the police action was "designed" to elicit incriminating information. 79 This
interpretation clears up a good deal of the confusion created by the
majority's discussion of intent. 80 The test requires examination only of
the "objective purpose manifested by the police." 81 If an objective observer could conclude that the officer's action was not designed to induce a statement, then the suspect would probably view the officer's
purpose in the same way. 82 Thus, the perceptions of the suspect,
which should be the focus of Innis, are of significant relevance.
The role of intent in the Innis definition is probably the test's most
confusing aspect. Intent can be considered, but it is of limited significance. 83 To confound matters further, the Innis Court concluded that
officers can be held responsible only for what they knew or should
have known. 84 Professor White properly appreciated that, while
phrased in terms of intent, the Innis standard is primarily concerned
with a suspect's perceptions. 85 Again, his reading of the test focuses
on an objective observer's perceptions of what was intended. But beIt should be noted that Stevens, in addition to characterizing the majority's view, created his own
definition of interrogation encompassing "any police statement or conduct that has the same
purpose or effect as a direct question [including s]tatements that call for a response from the
suspect, as well as those that are designed to do so." Innis, 446 U.S. at 311 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
77. TRENDS, supra note 27, at 91 (remarks by Professor Kamisar)..Under the probability
approach, courts would consider "all the circumstances known to the police to determine
whether the apparent probability of an incriminating response is high enough to be characterized
as 'reasonably likely.'" White, supra note 27, at 1224-25.
78. Such a test, which allows courts to consider many factors, is reminiscent of the voluntariness approach and would likewise raise all of the same difficulties. See infra note 164 (discussing
voluntariness test).
79. White, supra note 27, at 1232 ("If an objective observer (with the same knowledge of the
suspect as the police officer) would, on the sole basis of hearing the officer's remarks, infer that
the remarks were designed to elicit an incriminating response, then the remarks should constitute
'interrogation.' ").
80. See supra text accompanying notes 23-34 & 66 (suggesting the limited significance of
police intent in the Innis context).
81. White, supra note 27, at 1231 (emphasis in original).
82. Id. at 1231-33.
83. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
85. See White, supra note 27, at 1232-33.
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cause police cannot reasonably be expected to know all of a suspect's
peculiarities, White's objective observer has the same knowledge of the
suspect as the police. 86 Unless the police should know something
unique about a suspect, interrogation depends on the effect of police
conduct on the average suspect. The test becomes an examination of
whether an average person in the suspect's position would believe that
police intended him to make an incriminating response. ,
Although White's analysis of the suspect's perceptions and what
the police "should have known" appears correct, by phrasing his test
in terms of intent, he risks the same problems produced by the Innis
Court's language. Intent becomes too central to the analysis. Admittedly, White's approach is within the bounds of Innis because he focuses on an objective observer's perceptions of intent rather than the
officers' actual intent. 87 In most cases attention to perceptions of what
the police "designed" will not prove a problem. Difficulties arise,
however, in cases such as Innis, in which police have evoked incriminating statements by conduct that can be deemed to have some purpose other than to elicit a response. In Innis, there is a plausible
argument that an objective observer could conclude that the officer's
remarks were made out of genuine concern for the risks posed by the
hidden weapon. 88 The dangers of intent analysis in the interrogation
context are that courts sympathetic to police interrogation can always
find some other purpose for an officer's actions. By finding that the
police did not intend to produce incriminating responses, courts could
permit police practices that compel incriminating statements in violation of Miranda.
A third interpretation of the Innis Court's language, advanced by
Professor Yale Kamisar, avoids the pitfalls of intent analysis.
Kamisar believes that the majority was focusing on the compelling
nature of the practice and not on the probability of its success. 89 He
notes that the words "reasonably likely" cannot be taken literally; 90
after all, if the police directly question a suspect, their likelihood of
success is irrelevant. If police conduct prods a suspect to make an
incriminating statement, it is the equivalent of interrogation regardless
of the probability of success. Kamisar was concerned with "coercive"
conduct by the police, "which is equivalent to 'express questioning' in
terms of its coerciveness. " 91 This focus on compulsion, rather than on
the government's purpose or design, properly recognizes that Innis is a
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See supra text accompanying note 79.
See White, supra note 27, at 1232.
See TRENDS, supra note 27, at 96.
Kamisar, U.S. Law Week Remarks, supra note 40, at 37.
Id.
Id. at 37-38 (emphasis in original).
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Miranda fifth amendment case. 92 Because adversary proceedings
against Innis had not begun, the Massiah and government purpose
analyses are inapplicable.93
Kamisar was also troubled by the Innis Court's "reasonably
likely" language because the probability of success should not matter
if a practice is not police interrogation. Interrogation, within the
meaning of Miranda, requires that the compulsion be official compulsion. 94 Unfortunately, the truth of this observation is not readily apparent from the Innis opinion. Innis assumed both police involvement
and the suspect's awareness of that involvement. 95 Nevertheless, all of
the practices considered by Miranda 96 and Innis 91 involved obvious
police action. The Miranda Court refers to the "police" component of
interrogation throughout98 an:d states explicitly "[b]y custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers. " 99
The Innis test considers "words or actions on the part of police officers." 100 In effect, the requirement of official compulsion and the importance of the suspect's perceptions mean that if the suspect is
unaware of police involvement, then there is no interrogation within
the meaning of Miranda.
This discussion of the critiques of Innis should reinforce several
key features of the decision. First, Stevens' reading of the majority test
suggests the dangers of treating the "reasonably likely" language as
support for probability analysis. Such a literal analysis gives courts
too much room to apply subjective preferences. White's objective ob92. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43 & 49-51.
93. See supra notes 23-34 & 42-45 and accompanying text
94. See Kamisar, What is Inte"ogation?, supra note 24, at 53; Kamisar, U.S. Law Week
Remarks, supra note 40, at 41-48.
95. The Innis Court did not consider a situation in which a suspect was unaware of police
participation. Innis himself overheard officers talking among themselves.
96. In each of the cases before the Miranda Court, defendant was questioned by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney. 384 U.S. at 436-57. While a prosecuting attorney is
not literally a police officer, she still enjoys state police powers and exercises official compulsion.
For other forms of official compulsions, see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 450 (considering police interrogation manuals and practices discussed therein, all of which involve a suspect's awareness of
police participation); 384 U.S. at 452 (considering "Mutt and Jeff" act, where police presence is
clear); 384 U.S. at 453 (considering line-ups in which coached witnesses pick defendant as perpetrator or identify suspect as perpetrator of fictitious crimes; line-ups involve known police
participation).
97. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 300. Innis reviewed some of the police practices discussed in Miranda, all of which involved obvious police participation. These included the use ofline-ups with
coached witnesses and psychological ploys where officers would " 'posi[t]' 'the guilt of the subject,' to 'minimize the moral seriousness of the offense,' and to 'cast blame on the victim or
society.' " 446 U.S. at 299.
98. 384 U.S. at 445 ("interrogation . . . in a police dominated atmosphere"), 456 & 465.
99. 384 U.S. at 444 (emphasis added). The Court also stated: "We are satisfied that all the
principles embodied in the privilege [against self-incrimination] apply to informal compulsion
exerted by /aw-enforcement officers during in-custody questioning." 384 U.S. at 461 (emphasis
added).
100. Innis, 446 U.S. at 302 (emphasis added).
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server approach is useful for other reasons. His approach indicates the
importance of the suspect's perceptions at the same time that it holds
police only to what they should have known. By considering an objective observer's view of what the officer intended, courts can appreciate
bow an average suspect would view the conduct. Because such a test
is entirely objective, courts need not analyze the suspect's actual perceptions or the officer's actual intent. Courts need only consider how
facts known to the police about the actual suspect would affect the
perceptions of an average suspect. Unfortunately, White's test places
too much emphasis on intent. A consideration of Kamisar's analysis
helps to redirect attention to the central concern of Miranda - that is,
police compulsion.
The limited relevance of police intent to Miranda analysis rests on
the distinction between Massiah sixth amendment rights and Miranda
fifth amendment protections. The distinction is partly formalistic.
When the Supreme Court refused to extend Massiah to the pre-indictment stage, it shifted to the fifth amendment in part because of concerns that use of sixth amendment analysis would eliminate the use of
confessions. 101 A new and different test for the pre-indictment period
helped reduce these fears.
In addition, constitutional language lends force to the distinction.
The fifth amendment specifies that no person "shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself." 102 The sixth
amendment sets out the right to counsel more generally, stating only
that the "accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of
Counsel for bis defence." 103 The language of the fifth amendment protects an individual's right to be free from undue compulsion. The subjective nature of the concept of compulsion suggests that a violation
only occurs when an individual senses compulsion. Even if the government intends to produce an incriminating statement, a suspect's
ignorance of government action keeps her free from the anxiety flowing from official compulsion. Finally, as a practical matter, the fifth
and sixth amendments involve different types of rigbts. 104 The fifth
amendment protects a personal right that is violated when police act
against an individual. It does not matter what police intend if the acts
cause the individual to be aware of unconstitutional pressures. At the
moment those pressures occur the right is violated. Miranda created
rules designed to dispel such compulsion. The Miranda warnings, by
reducing perceived compulsion, can thus eliminate fifth amendment
101.
102.
103.
104.

See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
U.S. CoNST. amend. V.
U.S. CoNST. amend. VI.

See Loewy, Police-Obtained Evidence and the Constitution: Distinguishing Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence from Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, 87 MICH. L. REV. 907, 928
(1989) (discussing the difference between the fifth and sixth amendments).
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violations at the moment they might otherwise occur. The sixth
amendment is more procedural, protecting the fairness of the adversary process. The fairness of that process becomes an issue only after
the commencement of adversary proceedings. · At that point, government acts designed to interfere with the process, to upset the adversary
balance, violate the constitution regardless of the suspect's awareness
of the violation. It is the government's action, rather than the suspect's perceptions of compulsion, that constitutes the violation. Thus,
while fifth amendment Miranda analysis functions to dispel compulsion, sixth amendment doctrine is concerned with preserving the integrity of the courts through deterring police misconduct. Consequently,
sixth amendment analysis focuses on acts intended to produce incriminating responses.
Taken together, this discussion and these critiques s_uggest a reading of Innis that is consistent with Miranda.· Courts should consider
whether an objective observer, knowing only what police should have
known, would find that the suspect perceiyed official compulsion above and beyond the pressure inherent in custody-.to rn~e an incriminating .statement,

II.

THE SUBSEQUENT APPLICATION OF INNIS IN '11HE LOWER
COUR~

Because cases implementing Innis deal with factually specific police practices, grouping cases according to certain. fact patterns constitutes the most helpful way to analyze the impact of the Innis decision.
Such classification reveals common methods of reasoning and demonstrates what Innis has come to mean in practice. This section will look
at those applications, dividing the cases based on similarities of fact
patterns.
·
A. Friends and Relatives
A number of cases consider the role offriends and relatives in eliciting incriminating responses from suspects in custody. Such a situation usually arises when either a relative asks to speak to the
defendant 105 or the suspect seeks to converse with the relative 106
(although in some cases the police bring about the meeting 107). Even
when the police arrange the meeting, however, most courts find that
involving friends or relatives does not constitute interrogation. Unfortunately, these courts appear to reach this conclusion for the wrong
reasons.
105. See, e.g•• Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (1987); United States ex. rel Church v.
DeRobertis, 771 F.2d 1015, 1017 (7th Cir. 1985).
106. See, e.g., People v. Wojtkowski, 167 Cal. App. 3d 1077, 213 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1985).
107. See, e.g., State v. Loyd, 425 So. 2d 710, 713 (La. 1983).
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The Innis test, read literally, requires courts to consider what the
police believe to be reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. In cases where friends or relatives are involved, this reading
directs courts to examine whether it was likely that the presence of
friends or relatives would produce incriminating statements. But as
Justice Stevens anticipated, the language of probability gives courts
discretion to consider police intent - the officers' good-faith judgment
as to what was likely to occur. 108 Indeed, in applying the Innis test,
lower courts have shifted attention to police intent. If the police did
not intend to get an incriminating response, then the lower courts are
much less likely to find that an incriminating response was reasonably
likely.
This emphasis on intent indicates confusion between fifth amendment analysis under Miranda and sixth amendment analysis under
Massiah. Under Innis and Miranda the focus should be on the perception of the suspect regarding police compulsion. 109 However, the
Supreme Court itself appears to have condoned the focus on intent
and considerably confused the law of interrogation in Arizona v.
Mauro. 110 There, the Court upheld the admission of a recording made
when police permitted defendant's wife to speak with her husband. 111
The prosecution used the tape to rebut respondent's insanity defense.
The Court admitted that police "knew it was 'possible' that [defendant] might make incriminating statements if he saw his wife." 112 Nevertheless, the Court found that the practice was not one that police
knew was "reasonably likely" to elicit an incriminating response. For
the Court, it was significant that although the officers knew of the
"possibility," they did not send Mrs. Mauro to see her husband for the
purpose of producing such evidence. 113 Consequently, the opinion
seemed to imply that there was no interrogation because Mrs. Mauro
was not a government agent. 11 4
This approach is incorrect because the government's purpose is an
108. Innis, 446 U.S. at 314 &n.13 (Stevens, J. dissenting) ("Ifa suspect does not appear to be
susceptible to a particular type of psychological pressure, the police are apparently free to exert
that pressure on him despite his request for counsel, so long as they are careful not to punctuate
their statements with question marks . • . . Under these circumstances, courts might well find
themselves deferring to what appeared to be good-faith judgments on the part of police.").
109. See supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
110. 481 U.S. 520 (1987).
111. Although a police officer was present during the meeting, the officer did not speak. 481
U.S. at 527.
112. 481 U.S. at 524.
113. 481 U.S. at 522. In fact, it was Mrs. Mauro who requested the opportunity to speak to
her husband.
114. The Court emphasized facts that led it to conclude that Mrs. Mauro was not a government agent At several points, the opinion states that the police were reluctant to allow the
meeting, 481 U.S. at 522; 481 U.S. at 528 (tried to discourage her from talking to her husband).
In addition, the Court found that the meeting was not desired by police as a means to get a
confession, but was Mrs. Mauro's idea, 481 U.S. at 523-24.
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issue in a Massiah-type case, but it is not an issue under an Innis analysis. Because Mauro was an Innis case (Mauro had not yet been indicted), it should have made no difference what the government
intended. Rather, the issue in Mauro should have been whether defendant was subjected to official compulsion to confess. The Court
should have considered Mauro's perception of pressure fl.owing from
the police. 115 Because Mauro's wife could not exert such official pressure, her discussion with him should not have constituted police interrogation 116 within the meaning of Miranda. 117 Moreover, it is
irrelevant whether Mrs. Mauro was a government agent if Mauro did
not view his wife as possessing official authority to compel his confession. Justice Powell's opinion failed to take advantage of an easy solution: without the police there is no police interrogation. 118 The Court
reached the correct result but the emphasis of its analysis confused the
issues. 119
Other courts have also given undue weight to the government's
purpose. The Seventh Circuit, in United States ex rel. Church v.
DeRobertis, 120 applied a similar "intent" analysis. The DeRobertis
115. See Kamisar, U.S. Law Week Remarks, supra note 40, at 36-48; supra notes 61-69 and
accompanying text.
116. The fact that Mauro was in custody, while certainly producing anxiety, could not tum
the wife's discussions with him into interrogation. Innis requires a measure of compulsion above
that inherent in custody. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. In some circumstances,
the wife could take on the air of authority such that her actions would constitute interrogation.
See Kamisar, U.S. Law Week Remarks, supra note 40, at 47-48. If the wife had urged or begged
Mauro to confess in front of the officer her actions may have taken on "the color of 'police
blue.' " Id. at 47. Mauro would have perceived such a challenge, to display honor and decency
by confessing, as coming from his wife and the officer. Also, the wife might have told Mauro
that she was a government agent sent to get his confession. Under these circumstances, the wife's
actions would become official compulsion, making her behavior interrogation.
117. See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
118. The Mauro case is considerably complicated by the fact that an officer was present
during the meeting between Mauro and his wife. As noted above, the presence of the officer and
the tape recorder could have caused Mrs. Mauro's remarks to take on the "color of blue" and
become interrogation. Supra note 116. In addition, interrogation would have occurred if the
officer's participation had functioned to compel a confession - for example, if the officer had
asked Mauro direct questions about the crime during the meeting. The Court, however, downplayed the importance of the officer's role, 481 U.S. at 523-24 (stressing that the officer was only
there to insure the wife's safety and to maintain legitimate security concems);·481 U.S. at 527 &
527 n.4 (stressing that the officer spoke to the wife and asked no questions about the crime or
Mauro's conduct). It is fairly clear that the officer did not produce official compulsion above the
level inherent in custody. For this reason, discussion has focused on the consequences of the
wife's actions alone. For purposes of analysis, and apparently from the Supreme Court's point of
view, it is as if the wife spoke to the suspect alone.
119. The Court's Mauro opinion, while preoccupied with intent, can be read consistently
with an analysis that properly considers the suspect's perceptions of official compulsion. The
Court did discuss the coerciveness of the "interrogation environment." The majority also mentioned the relevance of defendant's viewpoint when told that his wife wanted to speak with him.
The opinion suggests that Mauro could not have felt that he was being "coerced" by such a
meeting and may have found no interrogation on this ground. 481 U.S. at 528-29. Unfortunately, the Court's emphasis on intent distorted this otherwise correct analysis.
120. 771 F.2d 1015 (7th Cir. 1985).
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court held that detectives did not "interrogate" the defendant by putting his older brother in the cell, although they knew that the older
brother would urge the defendant to confess. 121 The court did not find
the incriminating statements "reasonably likely," though the results
were foreseeable, because the police did not intend or designedly set
out to achieve such results. 122 The Seventh Circuit justified its focus
on intent by stating that the court in Innis was concerned with official
trickery. It noted that the detectives in DeRobertis did not plant in the
brother's mind the desire to elicit the incriminating response and did
not initiate the idea of consultation. 123 Thus, there was neither improper intent nor official trickery. Although the court used the language of probability, the analysis centered on intent.
Rather than considering purpose, the Seventh Circuit should have
examined defendant's perception of official pressure. Under such an
approach, if the suspect did not know that he was dealing with a government agent, there would be no police pressure, inherent, informal
or otherwise. 124 The decision indicates the weakness of Innis' "reasonably likely" language. Even if the brother's actions were extremely
"likely" to produce an incriminating statement, there would still be no
police interrogation within the meaning of Miranda because the suspect was unaware of official pressure.125
The focus on police intent in the friends and relatives area would
permit the admission of almost all confessions. Courts can always find
innocent motives when the police permit (or in the case of minors require) a friend or relative to speak with the defendant. Such analysis
will encourage the police to use the practice to get damaging information and will not limit use of the practice to cases where official compulsion is absent.
Some decisions, however, emphasize a suspect's perceptions of
compulsion, apppearing to follow more closely the meaning of Miranda and Innis. The main concern of these decisions is whether the
situation involves police conduct "which is equivalent to express questioning in terms of its coerciveness. " 126 They only find interrogation
where there is compulsion - where the appeal of.a friend or relative
takes on the "color of 'police blue' " 127 through the circumstances or
pr~ence of an officer of the)aw.12s
121. 77.1 F.2\1 at 1018-19.
122. 771 F.2d at 1019. .
123. 771 F.2d at 1019.
124. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); supra note 51 (discussing Hoffa). The
case is like Hoffa in that the suspect did not know he was dealing with the police.
125. See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text .
. 126. Kamisar, U.S. Law Week Remarks, supra note 40, at 38 (emphasis in original); see also
supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text; Kamisar, What is Interrogation?, supra note 24, at 67.
127. Kamisar, U.S. Law Week Remarks, supra note 40, at 47.
128. Id. at 36-48.
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Several state courts have correctly focused on the presence or absence of official compulsion, and not on police "intent." In People v.
Wojtkowski, 129 the court held that an individual who was unaware of
government involvement could not be thought to experience the pressures of interrogation. The California Court of Appeals admitted recorded telephone conversations between a defendant and his wife
(after defendant was arrested for raping her) because defendant did
not know he was dealing with an agent of the government. 130
Wojtkowski highlights the distinctions between Miranda and Massiahtype cases - the court itself distinguished Massiah. Massiah had involved a defendant who did not know that he was dealing with the
government; 131 but because Massiah protections only arise after the
beginning of adversary proceedings, they were not relevant to
Wojtkowski. 132 Wojtkowski, a Miranda case, turned on the presence or
absence of compulsion and properly found no constitutional violation
where there was no official pressure. 13 3 Similarly, in State v. Loyd, 134
the Louisiana Supreme Court found no interrogation where the
mother of defendant spoke to him outside the presence of police officers. The court noted that she was neither an officer nor agent of the
law; thus, she could not imply that it would be so much the worse for
him if he did not cooperate. 135 Because the defendant did not know
that he was dealing directly with the police he could not have felt
undue official compulsion. 136 These decisions suggest that the use of
129. 167 Cal. App. 3d 1077, 213 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1985).
130. 167 Cal. App. 3d at 1081, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 849.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 23-34.
132. 167 Cal. App. 3d at 1082, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 849. In discussing Massiah, the court noted
that Massiah was premised on the accused's need to know that he or she was dealing with a
government agent. Only by knowing that on~ was dealing with an adversary could a defendant
appreciate that statements made could be used against him. However, in Wojtkowski, the defendant's wife was also the victim; thus, her adversarial status put the defendant on notice that
the statements could be used against him. See 167 Cal. App. 3d at 1082, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 849.
133. The court in Wojtkowski rested its decision primarily on the absence of official pressure
from the viewpoint of defendant. However, the court also noted that the police had not intentionally created a situation where it was likely that the defendant would make incriminating
statements. 167 Cal. App. 3d at 1082, 213 Cal.Rptr. at 849. The court did not find the statements "reasonably likely," in part because the police did not intentionally set out to achiev~ such
results. See 167 Cal. App. 3d at 1082, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 849. Thus, even courts that properly
concentrate on the suspect's perceptions of compulsion can give too much sigliificance to intent.
134. 425 So. 2d 710 (La. 1983).
135. 425 So. 2d at 717. Defendant had no reason to believe that his right to control or cut off
questioning was limited. For the court, the mere fact of custody did not.make his mother's
presence menacing. The sanie observation about custody can be made in the jail plant case$. The
mere fact of custody does not make a jail plant's presence menacing. See infra section 11.E.
136. Similar reasoning can be found in State v. Pierce, 347 N.W.2d 829 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984). The Pierce court considered compulsive pressure when it found that the absen.ce of a
police officer during father-son discussions made the son's subsequent confession admissible. An
officer had informed defendant's father of the extensive evidence against his son and tliat it would
be better for defendant if he confessed. Apparently, 'the father, influenced by these remarks,
convinced the son to confess. (Although the father's influence on defendant's behavior is unclear
from the opinion, the Pierce court appears to have assumed that it contributed to the confession.
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friends or relatives to elicit incriminating information will be allowed
so long as there are not other factors that would make the discussions
coercive. 137 •
Other courts, while correct in their attention to official compulsion, fail to evaluate the suspect's perceptions of that compulsion. In
People v. Miller, 138 the mother of the defendant questioned him regarding his involvement in a robbery and felony murder. Though defendant was in his mother's apartment, police officers were present
when he made two incriminating statements. 139 The New York court
determined admissibility by asking if the mother were acting as an
"agent ... of the government" 140 with respect to each question. The
first statement had been made in response to the mother's unprompted
inquiry. Because at that time the mother was not an agent of the government, the statement had not been obtained as a result of improper
"compulsion." 141
The defendant's second statement, however, occurred when the
detectives, who had overheard the first response, asked the mother if
the guns were in the apartment. When the mother relayed the question to her son, defendant made an incriminating statement. 142 Here,
defendant's mother had become an agent, her conduct becoming " 'so
pervaded by governmental involvement that it los[t] its character as' "
private conduct. 143
The Miller court, while alert to the need for official pressure, failed
to appreciate that the suspect must be aware of this official pressure.
The court's discussion of government "agents" fails to appreciate the
importance of the suspect's perceptions of official compulsion. 144 It
347 N.W.2d at 832·33.) The court noted that the policeman's action was a less "disingenuous
technique" than the one used in Innis because it did not involve direct contact between the officer
and the defendant. 347 N.W.2d at 833. Pierce appropriately found no compulsion because no
officer was present to give the father's actions the "color of blue."
137. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text. These other factors include the presence or threats of police or statements by the relative that increase the suspect's perceptions of
official compulsion. For example, interrogation might have occurred in Loyd if the mother had
said to her son: "The Sergeant told me that if you do not cooperate, you are going to be in
serious trouble." Such a statement increases the suspect's perceptions of pressure, flowing not
directly from the relative, but from police.
138. 137 A.D.2d 626, 524 N.Y.S.2d 727 (1988).
139. 137 A.D.2d at 627, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 728.
140. 137 A.D.2d at 628, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 729 (emphasis added). The opinion correctly stated
that the protections against self-incrimination did not apply to "confessions elicited by private
individuals." 137 A.D.2d at 628, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 729. Constitutional concerns would exist
when private individuals act as "agents of the government or when government officials participate in those actions." 137 A.D.2d at 628, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 729 (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
141. 137 A.D.2d at 629, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 729.
142. 137 A.D.2d at 627, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 728.
143. 137 A.D.2d at 629, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 730 (quoting People v. Ray, 65 N.Y.2d 282, 284,
480 N.E.2d 1065, 1067, 491 N.Y.S.2d 283, 285 (1985)).
144. The Innis test itself states that interrogation includes "words or acts on the part of the
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does not matter that the mother was a government agent if the son
could not view her conduct as official compulsion. If a mother's behavior is not police interrogation "in the eye of the beholder," it is not
interrogation under Innis. 145 Because what a defendant does not know
cannot affect his perceptions, the mother's status as an "agent" should
have no bearing on the question of interrogation. 146 Rather than considering whether the mother had become a government agent, the
court should have asked whether the mother's act of relaying the
detective's question caused the son to view the question as the
equivalent of a direct question from the detectives. 147 He could, after
all, hear the officers asking the mother whether the guns were in the
house. When his mother directly relayed the question, Miller might
have considered it as coming from the officers and felt that they, not
his mother, were demanding an answer. Ifhe had seen her question in
this way, interrogation would have occurred regardless of the mother's
status as an agent and the Miller court's result would have been correct.148 Unfortunately, by emphasizing the mother's status as government agent, the court overlooked that Miranda turns on the suspect's
perceptions and distorted the meaning of Innis.
The errors of other courts are more basic in their failure to evaluate the existence of compulsion. These courts improperly tolerate police compulsion in the form of threats to a suspect's friends. For
example, in United States v. Thierman, 149 police detectives threatened
to interrogate the defendant's girlfriend if he did not cooperate. 150
One officer later testified that he had looked at defendant while speaking of interrogating the girlfriend and that he "guessed" he was trying
to get defendant to respond. 151 Nevertheless, the court found "nothing in the record to compel a finding that the police conversation was
police," 446 U.S. at 302 (emphasis added). See supra note 35 (under Miranda concern is with
pressure that police officers can bring to bear on a suspect); supra notes 116 & 124 and accompanying text (importance of official compulsion).
145. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (focus of Innis on the perceptions of the
suspect).
146. Kamisar, U.S. Law Week Remarks, supra note 40, at 41.
147. Cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 423 (1986) (no violation of Miranda where suspect
did not know attorney was trying to see him; "even deliberate deception of an attorney could not
possibly affect a suspect's decision to waive his Miranda rights unless he were at least aware of
the incident"). Compare Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 481 (1964) (confession excluded
where police told the suspect that his attorney did not want to see him).
148. TRENDS, supra note 27, at 92-93 (Innis test should be reformulated to consider police
conduct having the "same force and effect as a direct question").
149. 678 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1982).
150. When the defendant insisted on his lawyer's presence, one of the detectives left for the
girlfriend's residence. The officers who remained discussed, in the presence of the defendant, the
need to contact defendant's friends and family, and one officer commented that it was "too bad"
that the girlfriend had to be involved. 678 F.2d at 1332-33.
151. 678 F.2d at 1336.
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more evocative than the one at issue in Innis. " 152
The Thierman court failed to ask whether the police action was the
equivalent of telling the suspect directly: "Unless you cooperate we
will 'work on' your girlfriend." Clearly, any suspect would perceive
this statement as official pressure, and conduct that affects a suspect in
the same way should be deemed to be interrogation. Thus, the
Thierman court ignored the dictates of Miranda and Innis.
Courts that consider the role of friends and relatives in eliciting
incriminating statements make several common errors. Some improperly focus on police intent, which is the issue under Massiah, but not
under Miranda and Innis. Others concentrate on whether the relative
is an "agent" of the police, thereby disregarding the importance of the
suspect's perceptions. Different courts erroneously permit police to
threaten directly a suspect's friends in order to induce confessions.
Such analysis is contrary to Innis' dictate that official compulsion be
dispositive. In most circumstances, friends and relatives do not exert
official compulsion and confessions that follow should be allowed.
Only in rare cases will private behavior take on the "color of blue" and
rise to the level of interrogation.
B.

Volunteered Statements and Follow-Up Questions

Another line of cases that considers the meaning of interrogation
under Innis involves police questions following a voluntary statement
by the suspect. When these "follow-up" questions prompt incriminating responses, suspects have argued that the questions themselves constitute impermissible police conduct. However, although direct
questions are usually considered interrogation, the Innis Court stated
th11;t voluntary statements are admissible. Justice Stewart's opinion repeated Miranda's finding that" '[v]olunteered statements of any kind
are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not
affected by our holding today.' "153
Unfortunately, Innis does not reveal how statements made in response to police follow-up questions should be regarded. Logically, if
a follow-up question and the subsequent response are viewed as part of
the initial voluntary statement - as one event - they would fall
under Innis' concession for "volunteered statements.'' If, however, the
152. 678 F.2d at 1336. The opinion stated that fear of the involvement of family and friends
does not create peculiar susceptibilities because such concerns are common to all, and given
defendant's education and shrewdness, it was unlikely that he was susceptible to such pressures.
678 F.2d at 1337.
153. 446 U.S. at 300 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478); see also, Miranda, 384 U.S. at 533
(White, J., dissenting) ("Although in the Court's view in custody interrogation is inherently coercive, the Court says that the spontaneous product of the coercion of arrest and detention is still to
be deemed voluntary."). Again, the problem of taking the Innis language literally should be
obvious. Voluntary statements, which Stewart finds always admissible, will often be the result of
police behavior that was "reasonably likely" to elicit the incriminating statement.
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follow-up question is analytically distinct from the initial statement, it
should be treated as an independent direct question, the most obvious
form of interrogation.
Apparently guided by such logic, some commentators have asserted that responses to follow-up questions should be allowed if the
questions are a "continuation" of the initial volunteered statement because they represent "neutral efforts" to clarify what has already been
said. 154 Once, however, the questioner attempts to enhance a suspect's
guilt, police behavior becomes interrogation and the response is inadmissible.155 This a_pproach implicitly recognizes the suspect's perceptions of compulsion. A suspect should not perceive official pressure
when a question merely clarifies a voluntary statement. When, however, the examiner begins to hone in on the suspect's guilt, the level of
intimidation increases, thus impermissibly compelling an individual to
confess.
Several cases that have admitted incriminating statements appear
to follow this analysis. For example, in United States v. Egan, 156 the
court allowed incriminating statements which were the product of
"idle conversation" initiated by the defendant. 157 At trial, the statements were admitted into evidence after the court found that police
follow-up was not interrogation. The opinion noted that there had
been no "subtle compulsion" designed to produce an incriminating response. In particular, the court noted that the officer's questions did
not even relate to defendant's alleged crime; rather, the officer had
m~rely participated in a conversation on an unrelated subject.158
Other cases suggest that courts will not find interrogation where
"the officer simply requested clarification" 159 or explanation of something said voluntarily. 160 Typically, courts hold that the police officer
merely ~·continued the flow" of a conversation initiated by the defend154. W. LAFAVE & J. lsRAEL, supra note 1, at§ 6.7(d).
155. Id.
·.156. 501 F. Supp. 1252 (s:o.N.Y. 1980).
157. 501 F. Supp. at 1268.
158. 501 F.Supp. at 1267-68. The conversation involved defendant's restoration of a house,
his work in the trucking business, and his home in Massachusetts. Defendant eventually commented that his parents would be ashamed of him, which was, by implication, a confession.
159. State v. Lfilnb, 213 Neb. 498, 503, 330 N.W.2d 462, 466 (1983). In Lamb, the defendant, while in custody, asked a police officer, "How would you like it?" When the officer responded, "What do you mean by that?," the defendant answered "I have to do the cooking,
washing, the laundry. And I got tired of it ... so I shot her." 213 Neb. at 501, 330 N.W2d at
465. The officer's question was not considered interrogation because it simply requested a clarification of the defendant's initial statement. Lamb, 213 Neb. at 503, 330 N.W.2d at 466.
160. See, e.g., State v. Porter, 303 N.C. 680, 692, 281 S.E.2d 377, 385 (1981). In Porter, the
arresting officer radioed his supervisor to inform him of defendant's apprehension. The supervisor asked if the officer had recovered the stolen bank bag. The defendant overheard the question
and stated "The bank bag is in the car." When the officer asked "What bank bag?'', defendant
replied "The bag from the robbery." Porter, 303 N.C. at 683, 281 S.E.2d at 385. Since the
officer's question only sought clarification, it was not interrogation.
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ant. Such decisions recognize the logical significance of the fact that
defendant began the conversation. Discussions initiated by defendants
normally do not produce pressure above the level that is inherent in
arrest and custody, 161 despite limited police participation. 162 A suspect who initiates discussion with police is less likely to feel official
compulsion because he is likely to sense greater (albeit still limited)
personal control over the exchange.
At some point, however, an officer's follow-up question will begin
to exert pressure above that inherent in arrest and custody. Courts
using "continue the flow" analysis should find follow-up questions
that increase a suspect's anxiety above this level to be interrogation.
Thus, interrogation should be found when questions of clarification
become direct accusations, made to confirm a defendant's guilt. 163
Other courts fail to consider the suspect's perceptions and concentrate incorrectly on the officer's intent. 164 Courts sympathetic to interrogation can always posit a permissible police intention. The task of
161. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 470 N.E.2d 1332 (Ind. 1984). In Hill, the Indiana Supreme
Court found that because the suspect bad started the discussion, his subsequent incriminating
statement was voluntarily and freely made. There had been no "compelling influence" and the
"statement was uncoerced." 470 N.E.2d at 1335.
163. See, e.g., People v. Bodner, 27 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2414 (July 10, 1980). In Bodner.
the defendant came to the police and told them that his cousin had committed the crime. After
speaking to the cousin, a police officer informed the defendant that he believed the cousin's version of the facts and defendant confessed. The court found the confession inadmissible as the
officer's statements constituted interrogation. Rather than a "neutral effort" to clarify what had
been said, the policeman's statement was considered a "confrontation" - an accusation of lying
- designed to close in on the suspect. 27 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) at 2415. Since the suspect could
sense increased government pressure, the conduct became interrogation. As both Miranda and
Innis stated, to posit the guilt of the suspect is a form of interrogation. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 299
(quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 450).
164. Some of these courts incorporate intent as part of an "objective observer" approach.
People v. Papile, 113 A.D.2d 776, 776-78, 493 N.Y.S.2d 366, 367-68 (1985). See supra note 79
and accompanying text for a discussion of the "objective observer'' approach. They consider
whether an objective observer would view the officer's respqnse as an unhesitating reply not
intended to produce an incriminating response. Other courts consider intent as one of the factors
in a "totality of circumstances" analysis. State v. Lamb, 213 Neb. 498, 505, 330 N.W.2d 462,
466 (1983).
The "totality of circumstances" approach was part of the "voluntariness" standard used to
consider confessions prior to Miranda. While the test appeared to turn on the meaning of volun·
tary - was the confession "voluntarily" made? - it in fact rested on a complex set of values
that grew from conceptions of due process. The test barred admission of confessions that were
(1) unreliable because of the police methods used to obtain them, (2) produced by offensive methods even though they were reliable, and (3) made by persons whose voluntary power was seri·
ously impaired, though the confessions were trustworthy and not the product of conscious police
wrongdoing. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, at§ 6.2. But see Colorado v. Connelly, 479
U.S. 157 (1986), where Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion recast Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S.
293 (1963), by holding that involuntary confessions are only those procured through police misconduct and that unreliability is not a matter of constitutional significance. It considered the
"totality of circumstances" and scrutinized all surrounding circumstances, for no case turned on
the presence or absence of a single criterion.
As might be expected, the test was "inherently subjective,'' for it provided no adequate safe·
guards for defendants or sufficient guidelines for the police or lower courts. Because judges could
look at the totality of particular circumstances, they had unchecked discretion to consider their
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characterizing follow-up as innocently intended is aided by the fact
that such questions are often spontaneous replies to voluntary statements by the defendant. Courts focusing on intent often consider the
circumstances that prevented the formulation of impermissible design.
Some courts reason that interrogation only occurs when the officers
have had time to form such intent. Thus, where the question was a
spontaneous response, the officer could not have had the opportunity
to acquire the design or motivation to elicit incriminating statements.165 Whatever the result, intent analysis confuses the Miranda
and Massiah doctrines and ignores the importance of the suspect's
perceptions.
Follow-up situations pose severe difficulties for a defendant seeking
to suppress a confession. A problem arises because a defendant's
claim of police compulsion is weakened by the fact that defendant initiated discussion. In most cases, a follow-up question that merely
clarifies the defendant's voluntary statement does not exert undue
pressure and should not be considered interrogation. 166 However,
such questions become interrogation when they increase a suspect's
anxiety by positing or attempting to establish a suspect's guilt. This
subjective preferences. The vagueness of the term "voluntary" contributed to this difficulty. In
the end, lower courts tended to resolve such disputes in favor of law enforcement.
For discussion and criticism of the "voluntariness" test and consideration of "totality of circumstances" analysis, see generally MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 3 at 518-24; Y.
KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 1-25, 73-75 (1980) (calling voluntariness
test "unworkable"); o. STEPHENS, THE SUPREME CoURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT, 71-119
(1973); Herman, The Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the Good Old Days of Police
Interrogation, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 745-55 (1987) (discussing "the involuntary confession
rule"); Schulhofer, Confessions and the Coun, 19 MICH. L. REV. 865, 869 (1981) (standard left
police without guidance); Bator & Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation and the Right to
Counsel: Basic Problems and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 CoLUM. L. REv. 62 (1966) (term
voluntariness provided inadequate guidance).
165. See, e.g., State v. Porter, 303 N.C. 680, 694, 281 S.E.2d 377, 386-87 (1981) (emphasis
added) (noting that there was no "opportunity to reflect or consider whether his query was reasonably likely to elicit an inculpatory remark"); People v. Papile, 113 A.D.2d 776, 776-78, 493
N.Y.S.2d 366, 367-68 (1985) (emphasis added) (In an "unhesitating reply" to defendant's proposal of a deal, the officer asked "What kind of a deal?" and "What are you talking about?").
Others courts will find interrogation did occur when the passage of time gave the officer the
chance to form intent. See, e.g., People v. Bodner, 27 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2414 (July 10, 1980)
(Almost three hours passed between the time when defendant initiated contact with the police
and the officer accused defendant of the crime. During that time, the defendant had been sent
home and the officer had checked out the defendant's story and determined that it was false.).
166. In Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986), Justice Rehnquist considered when a
confession is "voluntary" within the meaning of the Due Process clause, and in the process
rewrote the history of confessions. The Court found admissible the confession of a mentally ill
person who had approached an officer and volunteered the information that he had killed someone. Justice Rehnquist stated that the critical element in confession cases, for "over ... 50
years,'' was the occurrence of police misconduct. 479 U.S. at 163. Voluntariness could not tum,
he contended, on courts divining "a defendant's motivation for speaking or acting as he did even
though there [had been] no claim that governmental conduct coerced his decision." 479 U.S. at
165-66. However, see Justice Brennan's dissent which found the holding "inconsistent with the
Court's historical insistence that only confessions reflecting an exercise of free will be admitted
into evidence." 479 U.S. at 181 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan's account seems a more accurate portrayal of history, see supra note 164 and sources cited.
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conclusion appropriately recognizes the significance of the suspect's
perceptions of official compulsion. Unfortunately, some courts underestimate the defendant's perspective and focus on the officer's intent.
C.

''Normally Attendant to Arrest and Custody"

While Innis does not speak directly to whether all questions constitute interrogation, 167 and no court has adopted such an absolute
rule, 168 Innis does provide an exception for words and actions that are
"normally attendant to arrest and custopy." 169 This section will begin
by discussing questions normally attendant to custody and suggesting
that routine booking questions are not interrogation in most circumstances. It will then consider common arrest procedures and conclude
that while police arrest practices might be due some deference, when
those practices further not arrest but investigation, they are outside
the Innis exception for actions attendant to arrest.
While some courts consider nearly any questioning to be interrogation, 170 the prevailing view is that questions that comprise part of the
"booking process" are permitted. 171 The latter position makes considerably greater sense, for it would be absurd to suggest that every harmless question is interrogation. An officer cannot be thought to
interrogate a suspect when, during booking, he asks: "Do you want a
sandwich?" Consequently, so~e decisions appropriately note that Mi..
167. See United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517, 522, n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (referring to Innis'
lack of guidance).
168. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, at§ 6.7(b). Under any interpretation qfthe
Innis test, it would appear that some questions will be exempt from Miranda's limits. This is true
for each of the three readings of Innis considered earlier in this Note. Under a "probability of
success approach," not all questions are equally likely to produce incriminating responses. In·
deed, many would seem unlikely to produce such evidence, see supra text accompanying notes
54-60; infra text accompanying note 172. Under White's objective observer test, it is possible
that an objective observer could find that some questions were not designed to produce damaging
statements, see supra text accompanying note 61. In addition, certain kinds of questions, particularly for routine booking information, are not likely to generate compulsive pressure, see supra
text accompanying note 62.
169. 446 U.S. at 301.
170. In United States v. Downing, 665 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1981), for example, police asked a
defendant, who had requested an attorney, to empty his pockets as part of police processing.
After a question regarding his keys, the subject made an incriminating statement. The court
found the question constituted interrogation, stating that once a suspect expresses a wish to
remain silent, any statement taken cannot be otherwise than a product of compulsion. 665 F.2d
at 406. The court suggested that the exception for action normally attendant to arrest does not
apply to express questioning but only to its functional equivalent, 665 F.2d at 407.
The Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Avery, 717 F.2d 1020, 1025 n.l (6th Cir. 1983), criticized the First Circuit, stating that the First Circuit has "apparently taken the position that any
form of direct questioning of a suspect in custody constitutes 'interrogation' under Miranda."
For discussion of the view that once a suspect invokes the right to silence or counsel the police
may not have any conversation in the defendant's presence that relates to the criminal activity in
question, see Sonenshein, Miranda and the Burger Court: Trends and Countertrends, 13 Lov. U.
CHI. L.J. 405 (1982).
171. w'. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, at§ 6.7(b).
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randa was concerned with questioning that enhances the pressures inherent in custody, which routine booking does not do. While booking
questions may be unpleasant, they do not increase the compulsion perceived by a suspect above the level inherent in custody. As a result,
courts should not find interrogation in questions that are part of a
routine procedure to secure biographical data.
Some courts recognize this. A few reason that Miranda protects
against interrogation of an investigative nature rather than against the
obtaining of basic identifying data required for booking. 172 Other
courts consider a variety of factors which might bear upon a suspect's
perceptions of official compulsion. These courts find it relevant that
the booking questions do not relate to the criminal activity and that
the defendant was not particularly susceptible to the questions. 173
In some circumstances, even if police practices go beyond the request for biographical information, they may .be allowed if they appear
as a necessary or routine part of police proc~sing and custody. Thus,
no interrogation was found when, in an effort to determine how much
an apparently confused suspect understood, an officer asked defendant
if he knew why he had been arrested. In particular, the officer sought
to establish that defendant understood his rights.174
Some courts examine the particular procedure to determine if it is,
in fact, part of normal booking practice. -Questions that are not routine ~hould be considered interrogation because they increase a suspect's anxiety and perceptions of compulsion. In Lornitis v. State, 175
for example, a police officer instructed several defendants to identify
any personal items in a truck where police had discovered bales of
marijuana. The court found interrogation becm1se there was no evidence that the identification of personal belongings in seized vehicles
was part of the normal booking or inventory process. 176 Similarly, a
"sham" claim that a particular procedure was normally incident to
arrest and custody ought not to immunize police behavior from Innis'
requirements. 177
The perception of compulsion should also increase if questioning
172. See, e.g., United States v. Regilio, 669 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1981).
173. See 717 F.2d at 1024. The Avery court included police intent as one factor in its analysis. Thus, the court found it relevant that the police did not use the booking procedures in order
deliberately to elicit an incriminating response. As has been stated throughout, intent analysis
confuses the Miranda and Massiah doctrines. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
174. Colbert v. State, 654 P.2d 624 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982).
175. 394 So. 2d 455 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
176. 394 So. 2d at 458.
177. Under this view, People v. Reyes, 133 Misc. 2d 174, 506 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1986), was
wrongly decided. In that case, the police successfully circumvented Miranda by calling their
behavior a request for "routine identifying information." Police had prodded defendant for his
identity over an extended period of time, challenging his assertions and investigating the proof
that defendant offered as to his identity. The lengthy interview went beyond routine booking,
and thus rose to the level of interrogation.
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functions to investigate a suspect's guilt rather than merely identify
the individual for processing. Police practices of this sort should be
considered interrogation. Thus, in United States v. Poole, 178 the court
found interrogation where questioning, although related to biographical data, worked to determine defendant's guilt. During the interview,
FBI agents accused defendant of certain robberies and the response of
a false name should have been foreseen. 179 The court considered police intent relevant to its analysis. "[I]n light of the investigatory purpose of the interview," the court refused to separate the improper
interrogation from the questions regarding identity. 180 The decision
properly recognized that investigative questioning is not a routine aspect of processing, but a component of interrogation.
Legitimate routine practices may become interrogation due to peculiar circumstances. It is fairly common for courts in these instances
to apply a "totality of the circumstances" analysis, reminiscent of the
voluntariness test. 181 These courts examine (1) the susceptibility of a
particular suspect; (2) the officer's knowledge of that suspect; and (3)
the particular crime at issue. 182 Thus, where an officer knew that a
defendant's driver's license was in police custody, a state supreme
court properly found that the only reason to ask defendant to locate
his license was to elicit an incriminating response.1s3
Although courts must look to the suspect's perception of compulsion, police intent is relevant to the extent that it sheds light on what
police knew or should have known. 184 Innis does not hold officers accountable for unique susceptibilities of which they could not possibly
have known. 185 Officers are only responsible for what they should
178. 794 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1986).
179. 794 F.2d at 467. Poole had given a false name when FBI agents demanded his identity,
date of birth and place of birth. The request for biograp~ical data was part of an interview that
included showing defendant surveillance photos of the crime and asking about defendant's
accomplices.
·
180. 794 F.2d at 466.
181. See supra note 164 for discussion of voluntariness test. Some courts even use the language of the "voluntariness test." In State v. Nelson, 459 So. 2d 510 (La. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1030 (1985), police questioned a defendant, in custody for driving while intoxicated,
about the ownership of the car. The defendant responded that he had killed someone. The court
found the statement admissible as it was "unresponsive" to the question asked, and "as voluntary
as if he had walked into the police station and announced his guilt." 459 So. 2d at 514. Cases
such as Nelson appear to consider the foreseeability of the response under the peculiar facts.
182. See, e.g., United States v. Avery, 717 F.2d 1020, 1025 (6th Cir. 1983).
183. State v. Ladd, 308 N.C. 272, 287, 302 S.E. 2d 164, 174 (1983). See also United States v.
Disla, 805 F.2d 1340, 1347 (9th Cir. 1986) (where an officer knew that large amounts of cash and
cocaine had been found at a certain apartment, asking defendant his residence was deemed
interrogation).
184. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text; infra notes 233-52 and accompanying
text.
185. Innis suggests that police are not responsible for unknown peculiarities. Justice Stewart
stated: "[S]ince the police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their
words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part
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have known about a suspect. For example, if officers could not possibly have known about drugs stored at a defendant's house, there
would be no interrogation when they asked the defendant where he
lived. An objective observer knowing only what police should have
known would not perceive such a question as excessive compulsion.
Despite these considerations, it should not be forgotten that intent is
of only limited relevance. Once a court concludes that police should
have known about the drugs and that an objective observer with this
knowledge would view a question about the defendant's address as
compulsion to reveal incriminating information, it would be wrong to
find no interrogation because police intended only to determine the
defendant's residence. Where an officer is aware of a suspect's peculiarities and those peculiarities make the question more compulsive,
routine booking practices should be considered interrogation. Such an
approach respects a suspect's perceptions and only holds officers to
what they should have known. In this way police are not crippled in
prosecuting arrestees and are able to ask routine questions that usually
do not exert undue pressure.
When arrests are involved, courts also respond to the added concern of danger to t4_e safety of police officers. For example, in United
States v. Bennett, 186 a policeman noted with some surprise the presence of a gun in the suspect's car. Though an incriminating response
followed, 187 the Fifth Circuit found no interrogation. The court stated
that the officer would have been derelict in his duty had he not warned
others of the weapon. To call such action interrogation would "put
absurd restrictions on the police." 188 For the court, words or acts
"necessary or appropriate to inform fellow officers of a potential threat
to their own safety and that of others during the course of an arrest or
custody, are 'normally attendant.' " 189 While the officer's exclamation
might have evoked a confession, it did not increase the level of pressure above that inherent in arrest. As a result, the statement might be
deemed appropriately within the Innis exception. 19°
of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response." 446 U.S. at 301-02 (emphasis added). However, in a footnote, the Court stated that
any knowledge the police did have concerning a suspect's "unusual susceptibility ... to a particular form of persuasion might be an important factor in determining whether the police should
have known that their words or actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response
•..." 446 U.S. at 302 n.8. See also White, supra note 27, at 1233-1236, 1233 n.154 & 1235 n.162
(suggesting that peculiar susceptibilities unknown to police are irrelevant); cf. TRENDS, supra
note 27, at 93 (remarks of Professor Kamisar) (suggests finding interrogation only when incriminating response isforeseeable).
186. 626 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1980).
187. As the officer pulled the gun from the car Bennett stated: "Yes, he had a damn gun and
he was going deer hunting with it and there wasn't no law against him having a gun to go deer
hunting •..." 626 F.2d at 1311.
188. 626 F.2d at 1312.
189. 626 F.2d at 1313.
190. Bennett might also be characterized as a case involving police words of shock or sur-
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Courts appear equally tolerant of another common arrest scenario,
in that they allow officers the opportunity to evaluate the nature of the
situation they confront. Thus, in People v. Reyes, 191 an officer responding to a domestic dispute asked the parties, "What's going on
here? It's pretty late." 192 Though an incriminating response followed,
the court found ·no interrogation. Rather, the court noted that Miranda only prohibits confessions "genuinely compelled, namely, the
result of coercion or overbearing of the will of the accused." 193 Here
the officer's actions were investigative rather than custodial, "designed
to clarify the nature of the situation confronted." 194
Bennett and Reyes suggest that where police safety or the ability of
officers to deal with an arrest is at stake, courts will find no interrogation. In most circumstances, the questions involved pose no difficulties because they create no compulsion above the level inherent in
arrest. Courts that permit such practices appear to be in line with the
dictates of Innis.
But some courts improperly equate the immediate needs of arrest
with the needs of an investigation. These decisions can completely undermine Innis because the purpose of interrogation is to investigate
crime. If the "needs of investigation" will permit practices that compel confessions, Miranda and Innis become meaningless.
The First Circuit appeared to make this mistake in United States v.
Timpani 195 • There, the court found no interrogation when FBI agents
refused to allow the defendant to call his lawyer and insisted that he
remain while they searched his apartment. The opinion conceded that
the likely discovery of evidence during the search might produce incriminating statements. Nevertheless, the FBI action was necessary to
an area-wide, coordinated search of loan-sharking operations. The
court recognized as a valid concern the fear that defendant might
warn others of the raid and prevent successful arrests.196
Unfortunately, the court failed to recognize that the suspect's perprise. The situations in which these words prompt incriminating responses are considered below.

See infra text' accompanying notes 278-303. Bennett appears to fall into both categories because
the record is silent as to whether the remark was made to the other officers, to defendant, or to no
one. 626 F.2d at 1310 n.4. If aimed at the officers, the statement can be seen as a warning
normally attendant to arrest. If directed to no one, it can be viewed as a statement of shock or
surprise. Since the court appears to analyze both of these possibilities, Bennett relates both to
this section and section 11.F. See infra text accompanying notes 300-03.
191. 133 Misc. 2d 174, 506 N.Y.S.2d 541 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
192. 133 Misc. 2d at 177, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 543.
193. 133 Misc. 2d at 176, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 543.
194. 133 Misc. 2d at 177, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 543. See also United States v. Castro, 723 F.2d
1527 (11th Cir. 1984). In Castro an arresting officer smelling marijuana asked "What in the
world is going on here?" 723 F.2d at 1529. Defendant responded with the offer of a bribe. The
court found the statement admissible as it was totally unresponsive and thus volunteered.
195. 665 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981).
196. 665 F.2d at 3.
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ceptions of official compulsion was produced, not by custody alone,
but by an investigation. Forcing the defendant to wait while his apartment is searched for incriminating evidence is similar to the common
police interrogation taqtic of confronting defendant with evidence
against him. 19 7 Both practices are likely to compel confessions. The
Timpani court permitted the action under tJ:i.e view that it was a procedure necessary to arrest. There were, however, other ways for police
to have assured arrest of defendant's conspirators. Defendant's presence did enhance the success of an investigation and functioned to increase the level of compulsion above the level necessary to arrest. As a
result, the officer's behavior was interrogation, not a practice "normally attendant to arrest."
The Innis exception for questions normally atteqdant to arrest and
custody rests on recognition of the practical necessities of police activity. Routine 'booking questions are essential to custody. Such questions, as long as they are in fact .routine,· norIQ.ally do not produce
significant official compulsion above and beyond that inherent in arrest
and detention. When, however, questions go beyond the scope of normal practice, they do increase the pressure above the level inherent in
custody and should ·be viewed as proscribed interrogation. Courts
should also be aware that a suspect's· peculiar susceptibilities can cause
the individual to perceive routine questions as official pressure to confess. Because an officer cannot be aware of every peculiarity, interrogation should only be found if the officer knows of these unique
factors.
·
Police safety and the conduct essential to arrest may dictate .some
de(erence to police procedure.· When, however, the pr?ctice furthers
not arrest but jnvestigation, it falls outside the Innis exception and
should be evaluated according to standard Innis analysis..If the action
increases a suspect's perceptions of compulsion, it should be deemed
proscribed interrogation.

D. ''Subtie Co'mpulsion"
Another group of cases involves police practices that can be described as "subtle compulsion." 198 Innis itself falls into this category
as do other cases involving conversations between police officers in the
presence of the defendant. Ta~tics· of "subtle compulsion" also include situations where police confront defendant with incriminating
evidence.
·
·
197. See infra text accompanying notes 210-25.
198. These are cases where it .cannot be argued that the practice was normally attendant to
arrest or custody. See supra Section 11.C. These practices cannot be characterized as routine

booking protedures because either they are not fu fact routine or they are totally unrelated to
booking. They are also practices which cannot be· deemed necessary to arrest of the suspect.
This is because either the suspect is already in custody, or arrest can be easily achieved without
employing the questionable conduct.
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Prior to Innis, there had been some confusion as to whether conduct in addition to direct questioning could constitute interrogation.199 Innis made clear that tactics and methods that are the
"functional equivalent" of direct questioning can be interrogation. 200
It does not follow, however, that all prompting is per se illegal, 201 and
courts have had considerable difficulty in this area.
Because the Innis Court itself considered police methods of "subtle
compulsion," the decision provides the most direct guide to analyzing
these cases. The Innis decision suggests that the degree of "prompting" is relevant to a determination of interrogation. Interrogation
should be found when the suspect perceives prompting as the functional equivalent of express questioning.
Thus, although Innis had been subjected to "subtle compulsion,"
this finding did not end the inquiry. The Court had to determine
whether the damaging response was the product of words or acts reasonably likely to elicit that response. 202 Words or acts do not become
undue compulsion, noted the Court, when "the entire conversation appears to have consisted of no more than a few offhand remarks." 203
However, there might be interrogation if the police carry "on a
lengthy harangue" in front of defendant and the comments become
particularly evocative.204 Apparently, a direct appeal to a suspecfs
conscience is only "subtle compulsion" and not sufficiently coercive to
be deemed the functional equivalent of express questioning. 205
1. Situations Involving.Conversations Between Police Officers in the

Presence of Defendants
Analyzing how other courts have considered the use of conversations between officers in front of the suspect illustrates how the tactic
can produce undue compulsion. For example, in People v. Jumper, 206
an officer entered the police booking room where another officer asked
the first if he knew the defendant. The first officer responded that de199. w. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, at§ 6.7(c).
200. 446 U.S. at 300.01.
201. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 488 (1980) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (citing
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1979)); Stahl v. State, 426 So. 2d 909, 916 (Ala. Crim. App.
1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210 (1983).
202. 446 U.S. at 303.
203. 446 U.S. at 303.
204. 446 U.S. at 303.
205. One can certainly take issue with the Court's ultimate finding on the facts of Innis. The
officer's "appeal to conscience" could be viewed as the equivalent of asking the suspect to "display some evidence of decency and honor" - a classic interrogation technique. See Innis, 446
U.S. at 306 (Marshall, J., dissenting). However, one might accept the Court's characterization of
the statements as a few offhand remarks. A few such remarks might not constitute an excessive
degree of prompting. In any event, it should be clear that interrogation occurs when such remarks produce compulsion and thus become the functional equivalent of direct questioning.
206. 113 Ill. App. 3d 346, 447 N.E.2d 531 (1983).
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fendant was the individual who had attacked him earlier. The defendant made an incriminating response that was later admitted. 207
The Jumper court made much of the fact that here, as in Innis,
there was a conversation between officers to which no response was
invited. 208 If that were true, then Jumper's response would, in fact, be
nothing more than a voluntary statement and would be completely
admissible. Unfortunately, the court failed to appreciate that the officer's remarks were significantly more compulsive than those considered in Innis. Jumper overheard not merely "oflhand remarks," but
direct accusations of his guilt.209 From the suspect's perception, the
officer's statement constituted the equivalent of the officer saying,
"You did it. Now do you want to talk about it?" Clearly, such a
statement would compel a confession.
2.

Confronting Defendants with Incriminating Evidence

Another tactic considered by lower courts under Innis involves
confronting a defendant with incriminating evidence. These cases
should be relatively easy. Both Miranda and Innis state that to posit
the guilt of the suspect is a form of interrogation.210 Because showing
a defendant damaging evidence functions to accuse him of guilt, the
practice obviously adds to the pressure to talk. Such conduct is the
equivalent of saying, "We have found the following incriminating evidence. Now do you want to talk about the crime?" It follows that
police interrogate a suspect any time they confront that suspect with
incriminating evidence.
Several decisions have recognized that these practices constitute
interrogation. These courts recognize that the level of compulsion increases when a police practice shifts from "inquisitorial" action to "accusatorial" behavior. Thus, confronting a defendant with
discrepancies in his story was found. to be interrogation.211
Similarly, courts have correctly found interrogation where police
· presented defendant with "apparently overwhelming inculpatory evidence in the form of written witnesses' statements and oral explanations."212 Others have found interrogation after officers showed the
defendant various police reports, implying the threat of prosecution.213
These cases correctly find interrogation in such circumstances because
207. 113 Ill. App. 3d at 349, 447 N.E.2d at 533.
208. 113 Ill. App. 3d at 350, 447 N.E.2d at 534.
209. This is significant in other contexts, see supra text accompanying notes 155, 163 (discussing positing the guilt of the suspect as a form of interrogation). See also infra text accompanying note 211.
210. Innis, 446 U.S. at 299 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 450).
211. People v. Savory, 105 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 435 N.E.2d 226 (1982).
212. State v. Uganiza, 702 P.2d 1352, 1355 (Haw. 1985).
213. In re Interest of Durand, 206 Neb. 415, 421-22, 293 N.W.2d 383, 387 (1980). The
concurrence in Durand appears to have applied the voluntariness approach finding interrogation
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the conduct posits the guilt of the suspect and undoubtedly increases
the perception of pressure.214
As with other fact patterns discussed in this Note, courts should
consider whether an objective observer with same knowledge of a suspect as police would view a police practice as compelling an incriminating response. Thus, Lewis v. State, 215 a Florida case where the
Court of Appeals considered a defendant's familiarity with police
techniques in finding no compulsion, was wrongly decided. Under a
totality of circumstances analysis, 216 the court found that because of
defendant's long felony record, he could not have perceived that he
was being coerced by police when they showed him incriminating information.217 Admittedly, the Lewis court's analysis did, to a degree,
resemble the proper approach. The court considered the suspect's perceptions218 of official compulsion,219 in light of what was known about
Lewis' prior record and familiarity with police techniques. But the
court underestimated the degree of compulsion and overestimated the
suspect's ability to withstand police pressure. A practice is not any
less compulsive because a suspect is familiar with it. To conclude
otherwise is to suggest that any suspect with a prior record can be
interrogated because familiarity breeds a strengthened resolve to resist.
Despite his prior record, Lewis was still confronted with police acts
that communicated, "We know you're guilty. Want to talk about it?"
The fact that Lewis made incriminating statements indicates that he
could not resist official pressure. Both Miranda and Innis made clear
that positing the guµt of the suspect is interrogation. 22° Consequently,
anytime police confront a defendant with .irtcriminatirtg evidence, interrogation occurs. Lewis should be no exception.
becaiise the responses were "involuntary." See 206 Neb. at' 415, 293 N.W.2d at 387 (Boslaugh,
J., concurring); supra note 1.~ (discussing voluntariness test).
214. Similar opportunities for abuse exist w~en a polygraph is involved. In one case, the
Fifth Circuit held that telling defendant that he.had failed a lie detector test was interrogation.
At the time of the statement, the test was not yet 'completed. The court properly appreciated that
it is common psychological ploy, which Innis itself recognized, 446 U.S. at 300, to "posit the
guilt of the subject." Henry v. Dees, 658 F.2d 406, 410 (5th Cir. 1981). See also Weisberg, supra
note 10, at 21-24.
215. 509 So. 2d 1236' (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 2025 (1988). ,
'
216. The court found that a robbery and attc;mpted murder suspect was not interrogated
when police showed him a video tape of the robbery which included footage of the shooting.
Since the suspect had a long and serious felony record, was familiar with police techniques and
had engaged in levity during the showing, the court concluded that Lewis had not been coerced
to confess. 509 So. 2d at 1237.
217. The decision indicates the problem with totality of circumstances analysis. By incorporating a broad' range of factors, a court can justify a coercive practice on the grounds that a
suspect has the ability to endure police compulsion. See supra note 164 (discussing totality of
circumstances analysis).
218. 509 So. 2d at 1237.
219. 509 So. 2d at 1237.
220. Innis, 446 U.S. at 299 (quoti.ng Miranda, 384 U.S. at 450).

a

.

April 1989]

Interrogation Under Innis

1109

Other courts err by completely failing to appreciate the significance of the suspect's perception of compulsion. They improperly focus on the intent of the police, which should be of only limited
relevance. 221 These courts fail to find interrogation where the officer
did not intend an incriminating response.
. But the officer's desire to "inform" a defendant has no bearing on
the suspect's perceptions of official compulsion. Courts will always be
able to justify tactics which function to improperly compel confessions
as efforts to aid the suspect's decision to cooperate. A whole line of
cases permit such practices on the ground that the defendant has the
right to know the charges he faces or the strength of the case against
him. 222 These courts often argue that such information will permit a
suspect to make an intelligent decision as to whether to remain
silent. 223
The problem with this argument is that it permits a coercive practice under the guise of aiding a defendant's informed decision. 224 Pressuring a suspect to cooperate is the functional equivalent of
interrogation and is no less coercive because the officers did not intend
to produce an incriminating response. Rather, interrogation should be
found when "informing the defendant" would be perceived as an argument by the officer that defendant should .confess. 225
Other decisions more clearly demonstrate the absurdity of this focus on police intent and the degree to which some courts go to admit
confessions. Under an intent analysis, they allow police to inform defendant of the procedural developments of his case. In one case where
use of the "tough-guy, soft-guy"226 routine was alleged, the court
found no interrogation when a detective stopped by defendant's cell on
221. See supra notes 61-69 ~ci accompanying text.
.
222. See, e.g., United States v. Guido, 704 F.2d 675 (2d Cfr. 1983); Hawkins v: United States,
461 A.2d 1025 (D.C. 1983), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1052 (1984); Stahl v. State, 426 So. 2d 909
(Ala. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210 (1982).
223. See, e.g., Guido, 704 F.2d at 675; Hawkins, 461 A.2d at 1031; Peopl~ v. Ferro, 63
N.Y.2d 316, 472 N.E.2d 13, 19; 482 N.Y.S.2d 237, 243 (1984) (Jasen, J., dissenting); cert. denied,
472 U.S. 1007 (1985) (describing placing stolen furs in front of defendant's cell as "little more
than simple disclosure of information which.might, in fact, contribute to an intelligent ex1:rcise of
his judgment").
·
224. See, e.g., Guido, 704 F.2d 675 which aptly demonstrates the notion that such "information" can produce a "decisfon to cooperate." In Guido, officers were discussing the benefits of
cooperation with the defendant. In the cour:se of the discussion the officers "merely supplied ...
information regarding the crime he was suspected of committing, in response to [defend;mt's]
own questions." 704 F.2d at 677. The court found no interrogation, pointing out that the discussion was not "designed to elicit" incrimiftating information and there was no evidence that
Guido was peculiarly susceptible to the appeal. 704 F.2d at 677.
225. Other courts make the same mistake even though they recognize thatjnforming a defendant of the charges against him can be the equivalent of positing the suspect's guilt. Such
courts allow this well established interrogation technique because the officer liad an ·innocent
intent. Hawkins, 461 A.2d at 1030.
·
226. See Weisberg, supra note 10, at 24 (describing the" 'friend and enemy' act in which two
interrogators alternate, one sympathetic and the other .unfriendly").

1110

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 87:1073

his way out to tell defendant that he intended to extradite him for
murder. 227 The court noted that the officer's only motive was his belief that defendant had the right to know he would be extradited.22s
The decision underestimated the fact that the officer used the opportunity to increase the suspect's anxiety. In the course of their brief meeting, he told the defendant that in the state where he would be tried the
death penalty was a possibility.229 While the statement might be
thought merely to inform defendant of his status, it obviously increased the pressures inherent in custody.
This is not to say that all efforts to alert defendant to procedural
developments should be or have been considered interrogation. In
some circumstances, the information might be considered a routine
and necessary part of custody. Thus in Tally v. State, 230 the court
found that merely telling the defendant that another police department wanted to question him about a theft was not interrogation. 231
The result was correct because while such information increases a suspect's anxiety, Innis requires a measure of compulsion above that inherent in custody. 232 Circumstances of custody may often require
transferring suspects between various institutions and police departments and police behavior associated with that legitimate practice can
be considered inherent to custody. When, however, an officer suggests
that defendant could get the death penalty, the officer improperly adds
to the pressures of custody. As a result, that practice should be considered interrogation.
3. Alternative Uses of Intent in Subtle Compulsion Cases

While intent should be of limited significance, Innis does not completely prohibit consideration of police design. Innis stated that intent
might have "bearing on whether police should have known that their
words or actions were reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response. "233 Some cases follow this direction and incorporate intent in
a way that is closer to the dictates of Innis. These cases appear to
employ Professor White's "objective observer" approach. 234
227. Stahl v. State, 426 So. 2d 909, 913 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982).
228. 426 So. 2d at 915.
229. 426 So. 2d at 913.
230. 455 So. 2d 186 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984).
231. 455 So. 2d at 188.
232. 446 U.S. at 301.
233. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-302 n.7 ("This is not to say that the intent of the police is irrelevant, for it may well have a bearing on whether the police should have known that their words or
actions were reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response. In particular, where a police
practice is designed to elicit an incriminating response from the accused, it is unlikely that the
practice will not also be one which the police should have known was reasonably likely to have
that effect.").
234. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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One such court, in Commonwealth v. Brant, 235 found interrogation
when, after a suspect refused to answer questions, an officer interjected
that his co-defendant had already made a statement.236 Although the
court considered the fact that the officer's acts were designed to evoke
an incriminating response, 237 the opinion made clear that the test was
"objective."238 Apparently, the c::ourt considered an objective observer's perception of what the officer intended. At the same time, the
decision acknowledged that while intent may be relevant, it is by no
means "conclusive."239
Under this "objective" approach, the suspect's perspective is not
lost because, if an objective observer would view the police action as
designed to compel a confession, a suspect would sense undue police
pressure. Thus, the officer's intent becomes important only to the extent that it sheds light on the likelihood that the suspect would perceive compulsion.
In most circumstances, analysis of objective intent, which might be
considered an "objective policeman" standard, will not cause difficulties. One can easily find that the remarks of the officer in Brant
were designed to evoke an incriminating response. 240 Difficulties will
arise, however, in cases where police have induced incriminating statements by conduct which can be deemed to have some purpose other
than to produce a response. 241 For example, in Brant, it is not impossible to argue that the officer intended only to alert the suspect to developments in his case and not to get an incriminating statement. A
court which accepted this argument would permit a practice which
clearly compelled a confession on the grounds of this innocent
intention.
In light of these difficulties, how then is one to make sense of the
Innis Court's discussion of intent? The answer lies in appreciating the
Court's instruction to use intent to get at what the police knew or
should have known. Innis makes clear that police cannot be "held
accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions." 242
Thus, a court should consider whether an objective observer knowing
only what the police should have known would view police action as
official compulsion to confess. In practice, this means that courts
must evaluate not what the officers literally intended,243 but what they
235. 380 Mass. 876, 406 N.E.2d 1021 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980). The opinion came down shortly after Innis.
236. 380 Mass. at 882, 406 N.E.2d at 1025-26.
237. 380 Mass. at 883, 406 N.E.2d at 1026.
238. 380 Mass. at 883-85, 406 N.E.2d at 1026-27.
239. 380 Mass. at 883, 406 N.E.2d at 1026.
240. 380 Mass. at 883, 406 N.E.2d at 1026.
241. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
242. 446 U.S. at 303.
243. These cases can be confusing because courts that use "intent" correctly and those that
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knew or should have known about the suspect.
Such analysis has significant ramifications when the defendant has
peculiar susceptibilities. If an officer could not have known that the
suspect's personality made him susceptible to a particular pressure,
then no interrogation can occur when the officer's actions produce an
incriminating response. Accordingly, some courts consider only the
susceptibilities known to the police.244 Thus, in Hawkins v. United
States, 245 the fact that the defendant was mentally ill was irrelevant
because the officer did not know that this made the defendant particularly susceptible.246
The Hawkins decision demonstrates the proper use of intent because it focuses on what the officer should have known about the suspect. Such an approach asks whether an objective observer who knew
what police should have known would view the practice as official
compulsion to confess. The observer's viewpoint would in most cases
reflect the suspect's perception of the police action.
Some suspects, however, do not share the objective observer's view
of the police action because of their unusual susceptibilities. Typically, these individuals would feel undue compulsion because from
their point of view, the officer intends them to talk. Under Innis, however, officers are not responsible for peculiar susceptibilities of which
they are unaware. 247 Thus, the Hawkins court properly decided the
case of the mentally ill defendant. Although that defendant perceived
official compulsion, most individuals would not. 248
- Sometimes, however, courts use this analysis when the suspect's
susceptibilities are not unusual. They focus on the officer's perceptions
do not both employ the language of "intent." The distinction is that correct decisions, while
discussing intent, are really analyzing what the officer knew or should have known.
244. See, e.g., Hawkins v. United States, 461 A.2d 1025 (D.C. 1983); State v. Stahl, 426 So.
2d 909 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982), cert denied, 463 U.S. 1210 (1983); PeoP,le v. Benjamin, 101
Mich. App. 637, 300 N.W.2d 661 (1980).
245. 461 A.2d 1025.
246. 461 A.2d at 1031. Cf. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (admitting statement
made by mentally ill person as "voluntary" because there had been no police misconduct).
247. But see Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), a Massiah case, where the Detective
who gave the now famous "Christian Burial Speech" knew that defendant was a former mental
patient and knew also that he was deeply religious. Since Williams was a Massiah case, see supra
notes 23-34 and accompanying text, it turned on whether the officer "deliberately and designedly
set out to elicit information." 430 U.S. at 399-401. Williams focused on the officer's intent
directly and considered the manner in which the officer used knowledge of the suspect's susceptibilities to produce a confession. But since Innis is a Miranda case, intent is of more limited
relevance. Once it is clear that an officer knew or should have known of a peculiar susceptibility,
analysis must concentrate on the suspect's perceptions. Courts must consider how a-suspect with
those qualities would respond to the police action at issue.
248. The Innis Court stated: "Any knowledge the police may have had concerning the unusual susceptibility of a defendant to a particular form of persuasion might be an important factor
in determining whether the police should have known that their words or actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." 446 U.S. at 302 n.8. Nevertheless, police are not responsible for the "unforeseeable" results of their acts. 446 U.S. at 303.
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of the suspect's condition and ignore the perceptions of an average
suspect. They seem to allow a coercive practice because an officer felt
that this suspect could "handle it." For example, in People v. Reyes, 249
the New York Court of Appeals considered the officer's knowledge
concerning the suspect. Defendant had been arrested after a domestic
dispute and at the time of arrest had appeared fairly agitated. In the
station house, police walked the defendant in handcuffs past iris wife,
causing him to make an incriminating statement. 250 The court found
the statement admissible despite the defendant's contention that the
police had deliberately created a confrontational situation. The opinion emphasized that the suspect "no longer appeared to be in an excited or agitated state."25 1. The court ignored consideration of the
potentially compulsive nature of the confrontation. Because the suspect "looked calm" the officer c.ould not have anticipated the result
and thus could not have intended to produce an incriminating
response.
A focus on the officer's appraisal of the suspect thus becomes another way courts examine the officer's subjective intent. Such appraisals of "calmness" can be used to justify what might otherwise be
coercive behavior. The court might have considered whether an objective observer with the same knowledge of the suspect as police would
view the officer's acts as official compulsion to confess. Such analysis
gets at the average suspect's perceptions, but only holds officers to
what they shpuld have known. Reyes, however, involved not unknown
peculiarities, but the response of an average suspect to a potentially
evocative confrontation. 252 Because officers should know how average
suspects respond, the fact that the suspect looked calni should be
irrelevant.
Unfortunately, the Reyes court emphasized that because the suspect looked calm, the police could not have intended to produce an
incriminating response. This ,kind of analysis will allow many coercive
tactics under the claim that the suspect appeared to the officer able to
endure the pressure. Thus, the Reyes court should have considered
the suspect's perception of the confrontation rather than the officer's
intention.
• 249•. 133 Misc. 2d 174, 506 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1986).
250. As defendant passed his wife, he declared, " 'I'll be out tomorrow. They can't do anything to, me because I'm your legal husband. When I get out tomorrow, I'll finish what I started,
and you'll get one right between the eyes.'" 133 Misc. 2d at 176, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 543.
251. 133 Misc. 2d at i77, 506 N~Y.S.2d at 543-44.·
252. Admittei:lly, the confrontation in Reyes might not have produced undue official confrontation. The wife was not government official and her presence alone is not enough to produce
interrogation. This Note takes greater issue with the analysis than the result.

a
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4. Distinguishing Between First and Second Level Miranda
Protections
Some of the "subtle compulsion" cases may suggest a way to give
content to the distinction between first and second level Miranda protections following the Supreme Court's blurring of those distinctions
in Arizona v. Mauro. 253 As noted, first level protections exist before a
suspect is given Miranda warnings and before he invokes the right to
counsel, whereas second level protections begin once a suspect invokes
these rights. Analysis under the two levels should differ. Under the
first level, the question should be whether the police interrogated the
suspect. Conversely, under the second level, the issue should be
whether the police "scrupulously honored" the rights asserted. 254 In
Mauro, the Supreme Court blurred !his distinction by finding that the
police do scrupulously honor the rights of the suspect when they do
not engage in interrogation.255
Some lower courts applying Innis appear to have presaged the analytic confusion of the Mauro ruling. 256 However, courts may be able
to continue recognizing some distinction between the two levels of
protection through a heightened sensitivity to the presence of compulsion in instances where Miranda rights have been asserted by a defendant. An example of how this might work is provided by two decisions
- People v. Ferro 257 and United States v. Gay. 25s
In Ferro, the court held that the police interrogated defendant
when they placed stolen furs, confiscated from a co-defendant, in front
of defendant's cell.259 When it considered the need to scrupulously
honor a suspect's rights once invoked,260 the opinion found that the
police did not "scrupulously honor" defendant's rights when they engaged in interrogation. 2 61
253. 481 U.S. 520 (1987).
254. See supra note 40 and sources cited therein (discussing first and second level Miranda
protections).
255. See supra note 40. Some critics have taken issue with the Court's failure to recognize
the importance of the distinction. See, e.g., Kamisar, U.S. Law Week Remarks, supra note 40, at
31-36. However, since this Note focuses on lower court decisions, a fuller critique of Mauro is
beyond its scope. The Note can only suggest how lower courts might evaluate first and second
level protections since Mauro is valid law.
256. See, e.g., State v. Uganiza, 702 P.2d 1352, 1354-55 (Haw. 1985) (finding that the police
"scrupulously honored" defendant's right where they did not engage in interrogation).
257. 63 N.Y.2d 316, 472 N.E.2d 13, 482 N.Y.S.2d 237 (1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1007
(1985).
258. 774 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1985).
259. 63 N.Y.2d at 319, 472 N.E.2d at 14, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 238. The court commented that
the Miranda rule was designed to counteract the coercive pressures of the custodial setting. Re·
jecting the relevance of intent, the court stated that an objective observer possessing the same
knowledge of the suspect as the police would have concluded that the action was reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response. Id.
260. 63 N.Y.2d at 322, 472 N.E.2d at 16, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 240.
261. 63 N.Y.2d at 324, 472 N.E.2d at 17, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 241. Critics of Mauro should also
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In Gay, the police also confronted defendant with physical evidence when they held up a tin and defendant responded, "That's cocaine too." 262 However, the Gay court distinguished Ferro and found
no interrogation. The difference between the two situations was that
Gay, unlike Ferro, had not invoked his rights before being confronted
with the evidence. 263
Although Gay involved first level Miranda protections and Ferro
involved second level protections, both cases asked the same question
- was the suspect interrogated under Innis? While Gay mentioned
, the "scrupulously honored" language, it incorporated those considerations into the definition of interrogation. As noted, it found interrogation when the police did not scrupulously honor defendant's rights.
Consequently, Gay might appear to restate the Mauro approach.
But Gay and Ferro illustrate that some lower courts - while not
asking a different question - do alter their approach to finding interrogation when second level Miranda protections are at stake. Thus,
both the Ferro and Gay courts asked whether the police action rose to
the level of interrogation. However, where second level protections
were at issue - where the defendant had invoked his or her rights the Ferro court may be more willing to find that police practices constitute interrogation.
The courts in Ferro and Gay asked the same question, but analyzed
the results differently. Critics of Mauro would take issue with this
approach, and would contend that when second level protections are
at stake, interrogation is not the issue.264 But given that Mauro is (for
now) good law, courts must give the distinction between first and second level Miranda protections continued vitality through other means.
The pragmatic approach suggested by Ferro and Gay may provide one
method.
Overall, an analysis of the tactics of "subtle compulsion" must
consider the level of compulsion involved in police behavior. Police
practices become interrogation when a suspect would perceive official
pressure above the degree inherent in custody. When "prompting"
becomes the functional equivalent of express questioning, any response
that follows should be ~admissible.
object to the Ferro opinion. Following the pre-Mauro approach, the issue should have been
whether the police conduct was the equivalent of saying: "We have recovered the stolen furs
from one of your accomplices. So you still want to remain silent in light of that development?"
Cf. Kamisar, U.S. Law Week Remarks, supra note 40, at 31-36. Such analysis would have recognized that officers must "scrupulously honor'' rights that have been asserted.
262. 774 F.2d at 371.
263. The court also distinguished Ferro because the police confronted Gay at his car and not
in a cell. Further, the police may not have known what was in the tin, whereas in Ferro they
knew the items were stolen. But these two distinctions do not appear as important to the court as
the fact that the defendant had not invoked his rights. 774 F.2d at 379, n.23.
264. See Kamisar, U.S. Law Week Remarks, supra note 40, at 31-36.
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Intent may be of limited significance when the suspect has unusual
susceptibilities. By considering an objective observer's perception of
the officer's intent, a court holds the officer responsible only for what
he should have known. However, in most cases, any examination of
police intent confuses Massiah and Miranda analysis. Such an approach typically permits improper official compulsion under the guise
of the officer's innocent intent.

E.

Use of the ''Jail Plant"

Another common police tactic that courts have examined under
Innis is the "jail plant." Typically, police place an undercover agent in
the defendant's cell in an effort to elicit incriminating responses.
Courts that consider this tactic interrogation err because neither Miranda nor Innis should apply to the undercover agent situation.
Innis extended Miranda to police methods that are equivalent to
express questions "in terms of [their] coerciveness."265 However, interrogation turns not on the mere existence of pressure, but on the
suspect's perceptions of official compulsion. Because a suspect is unaware of an undercover agent's identity, a jail plant produces no inherent or informal police compulsion. For this reason, no "police
interrogation" should be found within the'meaning of Miranda.· One
commentator has correctly observed: "[I]f it is not 'custodial police
interrogation' in the eye of the beholder, then it is not such interrogation within the meaning of Miranda." 2 66
Unfortunately, Innis' "reasonably likely to elicit" standard, if read
literally, would reach the undercover plant, 267 and lower courts have
acted accordingly. Several state courts have erroneously found the use
of the jail plant to be interrogation. For example, in State v. McMullan, 268 the court reached this result by focusing on whether it was reasonably likely that such an agent would produce incriminating
information. In his concurrence, Judge Smith objected that the jail
plant tactic should be allowed because it involved no "police coercion." A court, he argued, should not find interrogation merely because a defendant "ignore[s] [his] counsel's advice through cupidity,
stupidity, boastfulness, or remorse." 269 Nevertheless, Judge Smith felt
bound by precedent (the language of Innis in particular) to view the
jail plant as a form of interrogation.270
Other state courts, while correctly realizing that the degree of com265. Id. at 41 (emphasis in original). The Innis Court referred to Miranda throughout its
opinion. See, e.g., Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01.
266. Kamisar, What is "Interrogation?" supra note 24 at 65.
267. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note l, at§ 6.7(c).
268. 713 S.W.2d 881 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
269. 713 S.W.2d at 884 (Smith, J., concurring).
270. 713 S.W.2d at 884 (Smith, J., concurring).
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pulsion is dispositive, have erred in their analysis of the kind of compulsion that Miranda prohibits. In Holyfield v. State, 271 the Nevada
Supreme Court began by applying Innis literally, stating that the police should know that use of a jail plant is reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response. However, the opinion went on to address the
issue of coercion, stating that while coercion was the concern of Miranda, the presence of an authority figure was not necessary for a situation to constitute coercion. The court found that mere confinement
can produce a coercive atmosphere, increasing a suspect's anxiety. 272
The environment of custody itself made defendant more "likely to
seek discourse with others to relieve [t]his anxiety." 273 Because police
could control and select a suspect's companions, they could exploit
opportunities to elicit unfairly incriminating information.274 Consequently, the court deemed the use of the jail plant to be interrogation
in all circumstances.
However, as the dissent pointed out, this reasoning ignores that
Innis requires "a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself."275 Where a suspect does not know that the plant
is a government agent, the added level of compulsion is missing and
interrogation should not be found. A literal reading of the Innis test
does require "._ourts tp view jail plant tactics as interrogation. A jail
plant can always be considered "reasonably likely to elicit" incriminating information. But reading Innis literally is inappropriate when analyzing a situation beyond the scope of the Innis Court's reasoning.
Innis assumed awareness of police presence without which undue official compulsion cannot exist from the suspect's perspective. 276 The
suspect's perceptions are critical. 277 Because a defendant is unaware
of a jail plant's identity, the tactic must be deemed outside the scope of
Innis and should not be considered interrogation.

F. Implied Questioning and Exclamations
Another line of cases involves police statements that are not direct
questions; but concern casual conversations between the police and the
defendant. On their face, many appear to involve "innocuous" remarks and Innis itself makes clear that the "police surely cannot be
held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or ac271. 101 Nev. 793, 711 P.2d 834 (1985).
272. 101 Nev. at 801, 711 P.2d at 839.
273. 101 Nev. at 801, 711 P.2d at 845-46 (quoting White, supra note 10, at 604-05 (quoting
Dix, Undercover Investigations and Police Rulemaking, 53 TEXAS L. REv. 203, 230 (1975))).
274. 101 Nev. at 801, 711 P.2d at 839 (citing White, supra note 10, at 605).
275. 101 Nev. at 811, 711 P.2d at 848 (Steffen, J., dissenting) (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis,
446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980) (Holyfield's emphasis omitted)).
276. See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 61, 109 & l lS-19 and accompanying text.
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tions." 278 Nevertheless, some of these innocuous remarks can lead to
incriminating evidence and rise to the level of interrogation.
An accusatorial statement is one form of indirect questioning that
courts recognize can potentially constitute interrogation. 279 However,
many police statements are not as direct or are buried in pleasantries
and their evocative nature is less apparent. Only by recognizing the
compulsive nature of any accusation by a police officer can courts appreciate the extent to which such statements constitute interrogation.
Some courts do appear to have reached this conclusion. In Matter
of Albert R., the California Court of Appeals found that telling a defendant: "That was sure a cold thing you did ... , selling him that hot
car," represented the functional equivalent of interrogation.280 The
court noted that Innis prohibited not only express questioning but
"implied questioning." Once defendant had invoked the right to remain silent, further conversation concerning his arrest or charges
should have ceased. 281 The court made clear that it was irrelevant
that the officer had not intended to obtain such a response. The casual
remark was seen as a "flagrantly accusatorial" statement. 282
Other courts agree that where casual remarks tum to accusations,
they rise to the level of interrogation. In People v. Burson, 283 the Illinois Court of Appeals considered a case in which an officer, who was a
friend of the suspect, said: "Now, Jerry, you know better than to drive
that car."284 The statement produced an incriminating response. 285
Although spoken in a friendly manner, the officer's words posited defendant's guilt and attempted to elicit comment from defendant as to
why he had committed the act.286
Both the Albert R. and the Burson courts properly recognize that
accusations by an officer can be interrogation despite the friendly nature of the exchange. These decisions are especially appropriate in
light of the fact that a friendly and concerned attitude in questioning
suspects is a common method of police interrogation. By pretending
to sympathize with a suspect, police are often able to elicit incriminating statements. 287
The effectiveness of this technique would appear to be enhanced
278. 446 U.S. at 301-02.
279. See supra notes 155 & 161 and accompanying text.
280. Matter of Albert R., 112 Cal. App. 3d 780, 783, 169 Cal. Rptr. 553, 555 (1980).
281. 112 Cal. App. 3d. at 790, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 556.
282. 112 Cal. App. 3d. at 793, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 558.
283. 90 Ill. App. 3d 206, 412 N.E.2d 1160 (1980).
284. 90 Ill. App. 3d at 208, 412 N.E.2d at 1162.
285. Defendant had replied, "Yes, I know but can't you give me a break?" 90 Ill. App. 3d at
208, 412 N.E.2d at 1162.
286. 90 Ill. App. 3d at 210, 412 N.E.2d at 1163.
287. See lnbau, supra note 5, at 19; Weisberg, supra note 10, at 23-24.
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when the officer and defendant are friends. Consider, however, State
v. lkaika, 288 where an officer who was an old friend of the defendant
said: "What's happening? Must be heavy stuff for two detectives to
bring you down here?" 289 The court admitted the incriminating response that followed, reasoning that the response was unexpected because the officer's statement was merely a "pleasantry" or
"greeting. " 290
The court failed to appreciate that although the officer was a
friend, his statement represented an accusation and direct question
from an official source that was likely to increase the suspect's anxiety.
The decision reflects the common error of allowing direct questions by
police, which function to compel confessions, because of the friendly
nature of the situation.
In other situations, courts will not, find expressions of sympathy to
rise to the level of interrogation. Thus, in United States v. Voice, 291
two separate expressions of concern for the suspect, only remotely
connected with the crime, were held not to constitute interrogation.
In both instances it appeared that expressions of concern were not part
of a series of additional questions, but rather were isolated incidents. 292 The court noted that the "verbal conduct more resembled
the 'offhand remarks' the Innis Court condoned than the 'lengthy harangue' the Court censured."293
Some courts consider these cases through a "totality of circumstances" analysis. 294 In United States v. Hackley, 295 the court held
that a confession made in response to the direct question of "what he
was going to do in relation to this offense"296 was admissible. There
had been no interrogation, concluded the court, because the statement
followed a casual conversation about defendant's cousin. 297 The court
stated that it "must look to the totality of the circumstances" to determine if the admission was "made voluntarily."298 According to the
court, in the "context and setting" in which it was asked, defendant's
response exceeded the answer that the question anticipated. 299
288. 698 P.2d 281 (Haw. 1985).
289. 698 P.2d at 283.
290. 698 P.2d at 284-85.
291. 627 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1980).
292. In one incident, the officer noticed that the suspect appeared upset and sought to console him by telling him that "everything would be alright." In another incident, an officer asked
the defendant why he was not taking his epilepsy medication. 627 F.2d at 144.
293. 627.F.2d at 145.
294. See supra note 164.
295. 636 F.2d 493 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
296. 636 F.2d at 497.
297. 636 F.2d at 498.
298. 636 F.2d at 499.
299. 636 F.2d at 499. See also State v. Jackson, 351 N.W.2d 352 (Minn. 1984), considering a

1120

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 87:1073

Thus, a direct question concerning the crime at issue did not constitute interrogation in the context of a casual friendly conversation.
Such an approach appears to raise many of the problems of the voluntariness analysis. 300 As a friendly attitude will rarely be found an objectionable practice, incriminating reactions will usually be found
admissible. 301 This would seem to encourage creative police trickery.
Other situations in which police words do not involve questions
concern exclamations by police officers that produce incriminating responses. In one case a court found admissible voluntary statements
made in response to a policeman's statement of surprise: "There is a
gun in the car. " 302 The court noted that the statement was not
designed to elicit an incriminating response but was an exclamation a natural reaction - which the officer could not have considered reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. 303
The court's analysis shifted the focus from the suspect's perceptions of coercion to the officer's intent - what the officer designed.
The court suggested that shock or surprise prevented an officer from
forming an improper intent. As a result, the dispositive question became one of characterizing the remark. A determination that the remark was one of surprise ended the inquiry. 304 But by finding no
interrogation in these circumstances, courts ignore the perceptions of
the suspect and focus on the state of mind of the officer. Courts
should instead consider how the suspect perceived an officer's exclamation. 305 If Bennett could view the officer's statement as directed at
conversation between an officer and a jailed defendant who were watching television together.
The officer told defendant to change the channel and the two then watched a news story on the
crime of another inmate. Defendant suggested that the inmate should receive the death penalty
for such a crime. The officer responded that if defendant had committed the crime of which he
was accused he could be executed. 351 N.W.2d 352. The confession that followed was ruled
admissible. The Jackson court used what it called a "totality-of-the-circumstances" test. 351
N.W.2d at 355. Here, the officer was not looking for an answer. The remark had been spontaneously made and not in connection with interrogation.
300. See supra note 164.
301. For discussion of concern over the offensiveness of the practice as a goal of the voluntariness approach, see supra note 164.
302. United States v. Bennett, 626 F.2d 1309,1310 (5th Cir. 1980) (footnote omitted).
303. 626 F.2d at 1312.
304. But see Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane), a pre-Innis case
refusing to undertake the characterization exercise. That court noted that the rigidity of Miranda was its strong point. 616 F.2d at 873. It stated that the Miranda Court thought it necessary to avoid the factual difficulties inherent in an inquiry as to whether a police question was
asked in an attempt to elicit incriminating statements or asked out of shock or surprise. 616 F.2d
at 874.
305. For purposes of analysis, the discussion in this section assumes that the officer's exclamation was not normally attendant to arrest. See supra notes 186-94 and accompanying text
(discussing concerns of police safety during arrest). As noted earlier, because the facts surrounding the remark were not fully set out in the opinion, it is difficult to classify the officer's state·
ment. See supra note 190. If the statement functioned to warn other officers of the weapon and
was necessary to the officer's safety during the arrest, then the statement would be normally
attendant to arrest and excepted from the Innis definition of interrogation. See supra notes 186-
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him and the equivalent of a forceful demand: "Is there a gun in your
car?" then interrogation would have occurred. Conversely, an objective observer might conclude that there is no way to perceive the statement as calling for an answer. While the latter might have been the
case and consequently the Bennett result may have been correct, a focus on police intent distorted proper Innis analysis.
Cases involving indirect questions and police exclamations indicate
the failure on the part of many courts to consider the suspect's perceptions of official compulsion. Indirect questions are often permitted because of the friendliness of the exchange, regardless of the suspect's
view of the officer's statement. In the case of police exclamations,
courts focus almost exclusively on the officer - his intent or state of
mind. In both situations, courts would do better to concentrate.on the
suspect's perceptions of official compulsion. The officer's supposed
kindness or intent should be irrelevant.

III.

RECONCILING INNIS AND MIRANDA WITH THE
SIX FACT SITUATIONS

Miranda was concerned with the inherent compulsion of police interrogation of those in custody. 306 In clarifying the meaning of interrogation, Innis focused on the perceptions of the suspect. 307 Whil~ the
language of Innis is ambiguous, courts should apply the test consistently with the spirit of Miranda. The impact of the police conduct on
the suspect's mind should be the focus. Thus, courts must consider
whether the police behavior is such· that an individual will feel the
authority of the state pressuring him or her to reveal incriminating
information. 308 Courts should consider whether an objective observer;
knowing only what police should have known, would ·find that the
suspect perceived official compulsion -· above and beyond the pressure inherent in custody - to make an incriminating statement.
Such an analysis would not require police to be accountable for the
unforeseeable results of their words or acts. 309 The approach would
also be consistent with Innis' language. If an objective observer would
view the practice as signmcantly adding to the pressure, the police
should also realize that the act is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. The analysis can be applied to each of the six fact
patterns considered in this Note.
·
94 and accompanying text. Alternatively, if it was just an excited utterance, unrelated to police
arrest procedures, or was directed at Bennett, then it was outside the exception for procedures
normally attendant to arrest and should be considered under standard Innis analysis. While the
former was assumed, supra section 11.C, this section assumes the latter.
306. See supra text accompanying notes 41-53.
307. 446 U.S. at ~01-02.
308. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476-78 (1966); Kamisar, U.S. Law Week Remarks, supra note 40, at 41.
309. See Innis, 446. U.S.
301-02. .
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In cases involving friends and relatives, the approach addresses the
common error of courts misdirecting their evaluation of compulsion. 310 Courts tend to examine these practices in terms of the pressure exerted by the relative alone. This problem results from the
language of Innis, which asks what the police should know is reasonably likely. For this reason, courts seeking to address pressure from
relatives, while still staying within the language of Innis, ask whether
the police intended that the relative would elicit an incriminating
response. 311
But Miranda and Innis are concerned with official pressure - "police blue" pressure312 - and not the pressure of the relative alone.
Thus, courts must consider whether a relative's plea takes on the air of
authority such that a suspect would feel the official compulsion. 313
This is consistent with Miranda and the language of Innis because it
gets at the suspect's perceptions of official pressure. At the same time
it avoids the analysis of intent which is relevant to Massiah but not to
fifth amendment cases.314
Volunteered statements and follow-up questions should also be analyzed under an approach which focuses on the suspect's perceptions
of official compulsion. 315 In practice, this requires courts to allow
questions that are a continuation of the initial volunteered statement
and represent neutral efforts to clarify what has been said. Questions
that attempt to enhance defendant's guilt, however, should be
prohibited. 316
This approach is consistent with an examination of the suspect's
perception of compulsion. When an officer's questions go from "continuing the flow" to "closing in on the suspect's guilt" (pinning down
the defendant; knocking out possible defenses; or raising the degree of
guilt) the officer's questions become the functional equivalent of interrogation in the mind of the suspect. The analysis thus allows totally
volunteered statements at the same time that it gets at the compulsion
of police action that is the focus of Miranda.
The "normal-to-arrest-and-custody" exception should call on
courts to determine whether the practice truly is routine and necessary. 317 Routine requests for biographical data, while unsettling, will
probably not add significantly to the pressure generated by custody.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 105-128.
311. See supra text accompanying notes 108-125.
312. Kamisar, U.S. Law Week Remarks, supra note 40, at 47.
313. See id. at 40-48. Only in rare instances will private behavior take on the "color of blue"
and rise to the level of interrogation. See supra note 116.
314. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
315. See supra text accompanying notes 153-91; W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, at
§ 6.7(d) (suggesting the outlines of this approach in the follow-up situation).
316. w. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, at§ 6.7(d).
317. See supra text accompanying notes 167-73.
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However, excessive behavior has been allowed under the guise of this
exception. 318
Moreover, under certain specific circumstances, routine procedures may produce undue compulsion. Thus, courts should carefully
consider police knowledge of the suspect's particular situation. 31 9 Interrogation should be found where an observer, knowing what the police knew about the suspect, would be aware that defendant would
view the question as official compulsion. A court must make certain
that the police practices do not "reflect a measure of compulsion above
and beyond that inherent in custody itself." 320
Again, in the subtle compulsion area321 courts will do best to consider an objective observer's perception of official compulsion. Where
police conversations in front of the defendant produce incriminating
responses, courts must be sensitive to the pressures exerted on the suspect. Clearly, when the subject of the officer's discussion is the defendant's guilt, an observer would perceive official compulsion.
Confronting the defendant with incriminating evidence should almost
always be considered interrogation, because it functions to posit the
suspect's guilt. In all subtle compulsion cases, courts should direct
analysis away from the intent of the police that has tended to dominate lower court decisions. Intent should only be used to get at what
police knew or should have known.
The use of the jail plant should not even be considered under Innis. 322 Innis focused on the perceptions of the suspect of official compulsion. Because a suspect is unaware of a jail plant's identity, the jail
plant exerts no such official pressure. As a result, an objective observer, while aware of some prodding, could not find that a jail plant
produces the kind of pressure that was the concern of Innis.
Finally, in cases involving implied questions and exclamations323
courts should consider, not the officer's intention or demeanor, but the
suspect's perceptions. They should examine whether an objective observer could find that the officer's words called for an answer. Direct
accusations are a typical form of interrogation and should not be permitted because the officer assumed a friendly attitude. An objective
observer would sense the need to respond to police expressions of
kindness and sympathy. In addition, statements of shock or surprise
can be interrogation, even though the officer did not have the opportunity to form impermissible intent. If an objective observer could con318. See supra text accompanying notes 175-80.
319. See supra text accompanying notes 181-85.
320.
321.
322.
323.

Innis, 446 U.S. at 300 (footnote omitted).
See supra section 11.D.
See supra section 11.E.
See supra section 11.F.
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elude that the statement was directed at the suspect and demanded a
response, interrogation should be found.
One error common to each of these six categories is a preoccupation by lower courts with police intent. Many decisions dealing with
the question of what constitutes "interrogation" shift analysis from the
perceptions of the suspect to the intent of the officer. This misdirection may result from the fact that the test is phrased in terms of likelihood of success, and from the Innis Court's concession that intent is
relevant to likelihood. Thus, lower courts often look at an officer's
intent by considering his or her perceptions of the likelihood of damaging responses.
Unfortunately, courts often consider intent not as only one factor
but as the central feature of their analysis. When such a court first
finds that an officer did not intend to induce an incriminating statement, it then easily finds that the officer did not know that his actions
were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Courts thus
can use the likelihood language to justify decisions that often turn on
whether the police practice was "designed" or "intended" to produce
an incriminating response.
·
Because intent is of only limited relevance under Innis and Miranda, these courts are confusing Miranda fifth amendment analysis
with Massiah sixth amendment analysis. · Under the Massiah approach, analysis turns on the police officer's intent. But Massiah
comes into play only after judicial or adversary proceedings have begun. 324 Innis and Miranda are concerried with the period before the
commencement of these proceedings. Courts err by considering Innistype cases under a Massiah-type analysis. As a result, they often permit police compulsion that should be interrogation under Miranda.
This is not to say that all courts misapply the standard. But while
many reach proper results for the right reason, many c,ome to the
wrong resul~ ,or to the proper result through incorrect analysis. An
approach that looks to an objective observer's perceptions of the impact of the practice on the suspect would help produce results that are
consistent with the spirit of Miranda, with the language of Innis, and
with each other.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This Note has treated lower court decisions on the basis of the
factual scenarios they present because Innis demands a case-by-case
analysis. Such a grouping is useful because common concerns emerge
within each group. But while the method of analysis should be different in each type of case, in all cases courts should concentrate on the
suspect's perception of official compulsion. Courts should avoid too
324. See supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
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great a focus on intent that, while central to sixth amendment analysis,
is of only limited significance under Innis fifth amendment doctrine.
Under any factual scenario, such an approach will lead to more consistent and less subjective resolutions, which more closely reflect the
spirit of Miranda and avoid the problems this Note has discussed.
-
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